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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The time had come for Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson to urge Congress 
to give him more power, a lot more power.  It was the middle of September 2008, 
the United States’ financial thermometer was about to pop as the spark that was the 
United States housing and mortgage crisis had grown into a raging financial wild 
fire.1  The housing bubble burst of 2006 had kindled a ‘mortgage default crisis’ 
that proceeded to bankrupt homeowners and lenders nationwide.2  The ‘crisis’ 
grew and grew, spreading uncontrollably, until at last the investment ties to the 
‘Main Street’ mortgage lenders caught ablaze and nothing could stop the crisis 
from roaring into Wall Street.3  Financial giants burned, markets boiled over.4  
Investors threw their panic like gasoline onto the towering flames, unloading 
securities in fear of a free fall.5  The Treasury Department did what it could to 
contain the insatiable inferno, but still it continued to rage, with no signs of 
relenting.6 
The immense heat of the mounting crisis bore down perhaps most sharply on 
Paulson and the rest of those that worked, and indeed lived, in the Treasury 
building (which at this point remained open around the clock, every day, with only 
a tuna-fish and peanut-butter sandwich buffet to sustain those that tried to save the 
economy).7  It had become apparent to Paulson by this time that despite his best 
efforts, the financial crisis was on the verge of completely exploding.  On 
September 20, 2008, Paulson proposed the Troubled Asset Relief Program8 to 
Congress, a $700 billion capped bailout plan that created “a taxpayer-backed entity 
that would acquire mortgage-backed bonds from banks” at Paulson’s discretion.9 
Paulson’s enormous plea was crammed tightly within a two-and-a-half page 
                                                          
1 See infra note 20 and accompanying text. 
2 See infra note 20 and accompanying text. 
3 See infra notes 21, 25 and accompanying text. 
4 See infra notes 36–37, 39 and accompanying text. 
5 See infra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. 
6  See infra notes 38–41 and accompanying text. 
7 Daniel Gross, The Captain of the Street, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 20, 2008, available at http://www. 
newsweek.com/id/160119/page/1. 
8 Text Draft Proposal for Bailout Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2008, available at http://www.ny 
times.com/2008/09/21/business/21draftcnd.html?_r=1&ref=business. 
9 Gross, supra note 7, at 3. 
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document in the hopes of being quickly passed by Congress.10  Although lean, this 
proposal was crowded.  In addition to requesting the power to grant up to $700 
billion to buy “troubled assets” (representative of one individual effectively 
controlling five percent of the national gross domestic product),11 Paulson also 
asserted that this power should be free from any congressional or judicial review.12  
The panicked and weary nation stopped to take a collective gasp at the magnitude 
of Paulson’s request: was the Secretary of Treasury going to become the most 
powerful person in the world? 
Even after Congress poured amendment after amendment into Paulson’s 
proposal, striking section eight’s no review clause and adding numerous measures 
of oversight, the nation and its leaders could not help but grimace to various 
degrees at Paulson’s eventual powers under the Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act of 2008 (“EESA”).13  The reaction was extreme.  Historians and political 
scientists alike quickly jumped to labeling Paulson as the most powerful Treasury 
Secretary in the nation’s history.14  Many jumped even farther, begrudgingly 
                                                          
10 See Draft Proposal, supra note 8; Massimo Calabresi, Congress and the Bailout Plan: Business 
As Usual, TIME, Sept. 23, 2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1843642-
1,00.html. 
[Paulson] and his team had been working on his proposal for more than six 
months, in the event that more piecemeal approaches like the bailout of Bear 
Stearns or the takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac didn’t stop the bleeding. 
When things looked like they were headed for a crisis at the beginning of last 
week [(September 15)], he had a team up literally all night working with the 
Federal Reserve to frame a deliberately vague proposal that could make it 
through Congress. The key issue was to get something that could pass, and 
quickly, as failure would produce a panic that would be unstoppable. What they 
came up with was the broad, three-page plan giving the Treasury $700 billion to 
buy back Wall Street’s toxic mortgage-backed assets and eventually repackage 
and sell them. 
Id. 
11 Maura Reynolds & Peter G. Gosselin, Bailout Tab: $700,000,0000 Democrats Seek Oversight, 
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2008, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/21/nation/na-wallstreet21. 
12 See Draft Proposal, supra note 8, at § 8 (“Decisions by the Secretary pursuant to the authority of 
this Act are non-reviewable and committed to agency discretion, and may not be reviewed by any court 
of law or any administrative agency.”). 
13 Ryan Ellis, Tax Policy Director at Americans for Tax Reform, believed that Congress was 
“appointing a financial dictator.  Ellis continued stating, “. . . .Congress is giving a member of the 
executive branch virtually unlimited power for the entire economy.”  John Ward, Bill Gives Paulson 
Unprecedented Power, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/ 
news/2008/oct/03/bill-would-hand-paulson-unprecedented-authority/.  Former House Speaker Newt 
Gingrich believed that “[a] plan that relies on the former chairman of Goldman Sachs presiding over 
disbursing hundreds of billions of dollars to Wall Street is a terrible concept and inevitably will lead to 
crony capitalism and the appearance of—if not the actual existence of—corruption.”  Id.  House 
Representative Louie Gohmert further stated that “[s]ince this country started, since the Constitution in 
1787 . . . this country has never done anything like this, given this much power to one person.”  
Gohmert further stated, “It’s just wrong to our principles of American democracy to give one person 
this kind of power.”  Id. 
14 Richard Sylla, New York University financial historian, stated: 
Nothing quite of this scale has happened since the early years of the country 
when Alexander Hamilton wrote the Treasury act to give him the power to 
borrow and intervene in markets . . . . And in Hamilton’s case, Congress quickly 
clipped his wings, and no successor not even under President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt at the height of the Depression exercised quite such unfettered power 
again. 
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anointing Paulson as one of the most powerful men to have held any United States 
office.15  Buzzwords like “financial dictator” became commonplace, the 
“unprecedented” descriptor appeared so often next to the mention of the EESA that 
one might figure it was part of the Congressional title.16 
But, was the EESA really so “unprecedented?”  Yes, the $700 billion cap for 
the newly established Troubled Asset Relief Program was historically significant 
and indeed its management authorized great power, but when this power is 
considered carefully in context with other powers given to Treasury Secretaries in 
times past, Paulson hardly seems to be the unprecedented power-wielding giant 
that many made him out to be.  As many had seemingly forgotten, Congress has 
been lifting Treasury Secretary authority to such heights since the ink had barely 
dried upon the United States Constitution. 
History places the EESA and Paulson at the back of a long line.  Does the 
EESA’s “leap” in authorized power really surpass the leap taken when Congress 
authorized Alexander Hamilton to establish and manage a bailout of the early 
American financial system worth 7/8 of the total national debt?17  Or did the EESA 
give more power to Paulson to address the 2008 financial crisis than that which 
Congress gave Salmon Chase to essentially print money out of thin air to repay 
Civil War debts?18  Or can it be said that the size of the 2008 bailout will shake up 
the financial landscape more than it had been shaken when William G. McAdoo 
personally shut down the New York Stock Exchange for more than four months?19 
United States Treasury Secretaries have faced financial crises stemming 
from a multitude of varied causes throughout the nation’s 232-year history.  
                                                          
Reynolds, supra note 11.  John Ward of the Washington Times argued: 
Historical precedent for a Treasury secretary this powerful is hard to find: 
Alexander Hamilton enforced taxes by leading an army to suppress the whiskey 
rebellion; William G. McAdoo shut down the New York Stock Exchange during 
World War I; Salmon P. Chase issued currency during the Civil War that he later 
ruled unconstitutional as a Supreme Court justice; and Robert Morris personally 
guaranteed promissory notes during the days after the Revolutionary War, when 
the nation had virtually no credit.  Mr. Paulson’s authority in the bill, as written 
Thursday, is likely to surpass all of those. 
Ward, supra note 13.  Peter Grier of the Christian Science Monitor further stated, “Henry Paulson Jr. 
has become one of the most famous and, perhaps, consequential US Treasury secretaries since 
Alexander Hamilton assumed the office on Sept. 11, 1789.”  Peter Grier, Treasury Chief Paulson on 
Verge of Historic New Powers, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept. 23, 2008, available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0923/p01s06-usec.html. 
15 John Ward of the Washington Times further believed that “[i]n all of American history, it is 
likely that no government official besides a wartime president has ever been given as much power over 
taxpayer money as Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. would receive under the $700 billion 
financial rescue plan.”  Ward, supra note 13.  Julian Zelizer, a political history professor at Harvard’s 
John F. Kennedy School of Government stated that: 
 [Paulson’s authority] ranks with the top list of delegations of power, especially 
since there’s some flexibility for Treasury in deciding what to do with all this 
money . . . .   Zelizer further stated, “You don’t like to give power over finance 
and taxes to people who are not democratically accountable like Congress . . . . 
Id. 
16 See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra note 173 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra note 212 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra note 229 and accompanying text. 
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Depending upon the severity and need of each crisis, Treasury Secretaries have 
historically been granted very powerful authority to seek financial and economic 
stability.  The 2008 financial crisis, although unique in one sense, stands at the 
back of a long line of financial challenges that have called for the acting Treasury 
Secretary to seek and effectuate monumental powers.  This article will analyze the 
powers given to Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson under the EESA and compare 
such powers to those exercised by other Treasury Secretaries during past times of 
financial crisis. 
Part II of this article will summarize the financial crisis leading to the EESA.  
Part III will consist of an analysis of the authority and power given to Paulson 
under the EESA.  Part IV will begin to shed light on how precedented Paulson’s 
EESA powers really were, as the section will define the genesis of a congressional 
trend to magnify Treasury Secretary authority in times of financial crisis by 
examining the trend’s first and truly most powerful proponent, Alexander 
Hamilton.  Part V will further show that Paulson stands in the back of a rather long 
line of extremely powerful Treasury Secretaries by briefly noting some of the most 
historic residents of the line.  Finally, Part VI will provide a brief conclusion to the 
article. 
II. SUMMARY OF THE “CRISIS” LEADING TO THE EMERGENCY 
ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008 
Paulson had seen the economy boil to the crisis point for some time.  The 
dominos began tipping with the housing bubble burst in mid-2006, giving way to 
widespread mortgage defaults and lender bankruptcies throughout 2007 and 
2008.20  By the spring of 2008, the effect of the drastic increase of loan defaults 
(especially sub-prime loan defaults) began to weigh down on investment banks 
nationwide.21  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, “the Washington-based quasi-
governmental firms that together guaranty or insure $5.4 trillion in mortgages,” 
became increasingly strained.22  With the financial crisis alive and snowballing, 
Paulson attempted to combat the spread of mortgage defaults by bringing together 
the New Hope Coalition, “an industry-led group that would modify mortgages 
before foreclosure.”23  Despite such efforts by Paulson, and several interest rate 
                                                          
20 Gross, supra note 7, at 2. 
[T]he housing bubble burst in mid-2006; borrowers started defaulting on 
mortgages and lenders began going belly up.  The mortgages had been packaged 
into exotic securities, sliced and diced and sold as bonds and purchased by 
investment banks and hedge funds.  Because lenders, executives and traders had 
convinced themselves that home prices would never fall, anything went.  The 
result was debt layered on debt, piled on top of debt, supported by small amounts 
of cash.  And so as Americans in increasing numbers defaulted on their 
mortgages in 2007 and 2008, it kicked off a domino effect.  The value of the 
mortgage-backed bonds fell, as did that of the financial instruments based on 
those bonds.  Banks were forced to write down the value of their holdings and 
raise new cash from foreign sovereign-wealth funds—only to report fresh losses 
as the housing market weakened. 
Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 3. 
394 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. III:II 
 
cuts by the Federal Reserve, the financial crisis rolled into Wall Street with a full 
head of steam as the investment giant Bear Sterns24 announced that it had become 
insolvent.25 
The ramifications of an investment bank like Bear Sterns failing would have 
been disastrous for a vast number of individuals, businesses, and financial 
institutions; a vicious blow to an ever-weakening economy.  Paulson intervened in 
March of 2008, brokering a deal in which the investment bank JPMorgan Chase 
received credit from the Federal Reserve to purchase Bear Sterns at a bargain 
price.26  The move helped to avoid the immediate breakdown of the financial 
market; however, Paulson must have known this could not be the end, as the crisis 
ball was still barreling through Wall Street with several more investment banks in 
its path. 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac continued to feel the pressure of vast mortgage 
defaults into the summer.27  In July of 2008, Congress granted Paulson the 
authority to aid the troubled institutions if he believed it to be necessary for 
financial rebound.28  Paulson was optimistic that this action would not be 
necessary however, as he had hoped that the promise of federal support to Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac would be enough to rally investor trust in the companies 
they insured.29  Unfortunately, his hopes in the already rattled investors would not 
prove to be fruitful. 
On September 7, 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac essentially went from 
‘quasi-governmental institutions’ to ‘nationalized’ institutions as Paulson 
announced that the federal government would guaranty their debt and provide 
them with much needed capital.30  Not more than a week after this unprecedented 
bailout, Lehman Brothers (“Lehman”), another Wall Street investment giant, came 
to Paulson seeking a Bear Sterns-like rescue.31  Paulson was concerned that a 
                                                          
24 Bear Sterns was the fifth largest U.S. securities firm at the time of the August announcement.  
Alison Fitzgerald, As ‘Biggest Crisis’ Hit, Congress Held Nose and Backed Bailout, Oct. 6, 2008, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=a2PslgpVvrCI&refer=home. 
25 Gross, supra note 7, at 3. 
26 Id. 
Paulson knew the plan flew in the face of the free-market philosophy to which 
he, and all his colleagues on Wall Street, clung so fiercely.  But this was a special 
case.  When commercial banks failed, a tried-and-tested procedure kicked in: the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. took charge and made insured depositors whole.  
But there was no existing protocol or regulatory framework to deal with the 
failure of an investment bank.  And because of its massive levels of debt and 
significance in the markets for credit-default swaps—a sort of insurance policy 
against investment losses—Bear Stearns had the capacity to harm hundreds of 
financial institutions. 
Id.  When asked about the intervention in the Bear Sterns deal, Paulson told Newsweek, “The Federal 
Reserve believed—and I supported them—that it was the right thing to come in and intervene.”  Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id.  Paulson commented on such optimism to Newsweek:”‘If you’ve got a bazooka, and people 
know you’ve got it, you may not have to take it out.”  Id.  Newsweek translated this statement as 
follows: “if the market knew the companies had a federal backstop, investors would be more likely to 
give them more time to work out their troubles.”  Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
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“backstop” precedent would have been set if he gave similar aid to Lehman.32  A 
precedent of federal aid may have given other similarly situated institutions the 
idea that they really were ‘too big to fail’ and thus encouraged such institutions to 
take greater risks, sending a message that there was a net to catch them if they 
were to fall.33  Paulson also believed that a Lehman failure would not have 
presented the same kind of dire consequences to the economy that the Bear Sterns 
failure had.34  Paulson notified Lehman that he would not be coming to their 
rescue.35  Lehman filed for bankruptcy soon afterwards, a signal that is thought to 
have motivated the already teetering Merrill Lynch to quickly strike a deal with 
Bank of America.36 
However, Paulson’s strong-handed signal would not prove to be so frugal 
after all, as only days later the ever-snowballing financial crisis rolled into the 
doors of AIG; another financial giant that posed catastrophic economic 
consequences for failure.37  September indeed proved to be the culmination of the 
crisis.  On September 16, 2008, Paulson announced that the federal government 
was going to spend $85 billion to bailout AIG in exchange for an eighty percent 
stake in the company and the power to install a new Chief Executive Officer.38  
AIG essentially became as nationalized as the once private Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac. 
The financial market was at full panic as every investment bank and firm 
was suspected to be the next giant to fall.  Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley’s 
stock began to freefall as investors rushed to get out, “threatening to force them 
into mergers with other firms.”39  Even money market funds became tainted with 
suspicion as investors continued to pull their confidences.40  When banks 
nationwide began to refuse capital even to each other, Paulson knew the time had 
come for drastic measures.41  September 20, 2008 had arrived.  Paulson brought 
his plight to Congress in a two-and-a-half page proposal for a $700 billion capped 
bailout to be unilaterally controlled by the Treasury Department.42  Although the 
proposal was one that would lead to historic powers for him as the Secretary, 
Paulson took no pleasure in its submission.43 
                                                          
32 Gross, supra note 7, at 3. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id.  Paulson later stated at a press conference that he “‘never once considered that it was 
appropriate to put taxpayer money on the line in resolving Lehman Brothers.’”  Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Gross, supra note 7, at 3; see also CBS News & Associated Press, U.S. Announces $85 Billion 
Bailout of AIG: Federal Reserve Makes Emergency Loan to Keep Global Insurance Giant Afloat, Avoid 
Deepening Financial Crisis, Sept. 16, 2008, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/09/16/business/ 
main4453942.shtml. 
39 Gross, supra note 7, at 3. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Gross reported: 
It was a message [Paulson] never expected to deliver.  Henry Paulson—free-
market thinker, former CEO of Goldman Sachs and Treasury secretary to a 
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Even though many in Congress agreed that some intervention would likely 
be necessary, it was an uphill battle for Paulson to push his proposal through 
Congress.44  The day after Paulson proposed his initial bailout plan, he appeared on 
several popular morning talk shows in an attempt to gain public support.45  Within 
days, Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke appeared before the 
Senate Banking Committee46 and the House Financial Services Committee to 
testify regarding the bailout plan.47  Paulson was met with a great deal of 
opposition from both Republicans and Democrats on the issues of oversight and 
judicial review.48  Several leaders of Congress further voiced their concerns of 
                                                          
conservative Republican president—was unveiling to the world a massive 
taxpayer bailout of the American financial system.  Afterward, as he headed into 
yet another weekend of nonstop work with his team, carrying the weight of the 
troubled markets on his shoulders, the former college-football star was clearly 
conflicted about what he’d just proposed.  “It’s very unpleasant for me, but it’s a 
lot more attractive than the alternative . . . . We can spend a lot of time talking 
about how it happened and how we got here.  But we have to get through the 
night first.” 
. . . . 
While bailouts are regrettable and expensive, Paulson argues that one is needed 
to restore confidence in the system.  “We’re going to have housing issues and 
mortgage issues for years . . . . The key is to get stability.” 
Id. at 1, 4. 
44 See generally Fitzgerald, supra note 24. 
45 Id. 
46 Jennifer Yousfi, Paulson and Bernanke Testify Before Congress in Favor of $700 Billion 
Government Banking Bailout, MONEY MORNING, Sept. 23, 2008, http://www.moneymorning.com/2008 
/09/23/government-bailout-plan/. 
47 Joseph Goldstein, Bernanke, Paulson Face Tough Audience: Senate Banking Committee 
Members Stand Against $700B Bailout, N.Y. SUN, Sept. 24, 2008, available at http://www.nysun.com/ 
business/bernanke-paulson-face-tough-audience/86508/; see also Real Clear Politics, Paulson’s 
Testimony to the House Services Committee, Sept. 24, 2008,  http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/ 
2008/09/paulsons_testimony_to_the_hous.html. 
48 See Glenn Greenwald, Growing Right-Wing Opposition to the Paulson Plan, SALON, Sept. 22, 
2008, http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2008/09/22/paulson/.  Connecticut Senator Christopher 
Dodd, Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, was disturbed by Paulson’s request to be free from 
judicial review.  Jason Linkins, Dirty Secret of the Bailout: Thirty-Two Words that None Dare Utter, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 22, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/09/22/dirty-secret-of-the-
bailo_n_128294.html.  Senator Dodd “proposed a bailout legislation of his own, which critically 
call[ed] for ‘an oversight board that not only include[d] the chairman of the Federal Reserve and the 
SEC, but congressionally appointed, non-governmental officials’ and . . . require[d] the President to 
appoint an ‘independent inspector general to investigate the Treasury asset program.’” Id.  In Senator 
Dodd’s legislation, section eight was effectively stripped from the bill.  Id.  Senator Dodd’s proposal 
would have given deference to Paulson as the acting Treasury Secretary; however, it would retain 
judicial review: “‘Any determination by the Secretary with regard to any particular troubled asset 
pursuant to this Act . . . shall not be set aside unless such determination is found to be arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with the law.’”  Rod Smolla, Is Paulson’s 
Bailout Bill Unconstitutional?, SLATE, Sept. 24, 2008, http://www.slate.com/id/2200817/pagenum/all/.  
Robert Kuttner of The American Prospect believed that the lack of judicial review in Paulson’s proposal 
set his plan for intervention apart from others like it throughout history.  Robert Kuttner, Paulson’s 
Folly, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Sept. 22, 2008, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=paulsons 
_folly. 
The differences between this proposed bailout and the three closest historical 
equivalents are immense.  When the Reconstruction Finance Corporation of the 
1930s pumped a total of $35 billion into U.S. corporations and financial 
institutions, there was close government supervision and quid pro quos at every 
step of the way.  Much of the time, the RFC became a preferred shareholder and 
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bailing out the large financial firms over the average individual struggling through 
the down economy.49  Many members of both parties doubted that the bailout, 
even as large as it would be, would have any meaningful effect on the crisis.50  
Others were more concerned about to whom specifically they would be giving 
such power and authority.51  The majority seemed to believe that Paulson was 
indeed a well-qualified and trustworthy individual;52 however, Paulson’s proposal 
                                                          
often appointed board members.  The Home Owners Loan Corporation, which 
eventually refinanced one in five mortgage loans, did not operate to bail out 
banks but to save homeowners.  And the Resolution Trust Corporation of the 
1980s, created to mop up the damage of the first speculative mortgage meltdown, 
the savings and loan collapse, did not pump in money to rescue bad investments; 
it sorted out good assets from bad after the fact, and made sure to purge bad 
executives as well as bad loans.  And all three of these historic cases of public 
recapitalization were done without suspending judicial review. 
Id.  Kuttner further criticized Paulson’s plan with the following claims: 
It includes no oversight of his own closed-door operations.  It merely gives 
congressional blessing and funding to what he has already been doing, ad hoc.  
He plans to retain Wall Street firms as advisers to decide just how to cut deals to 
value and mop up Wall Street’s dubious paper.  There are to be no limits on 
executive compensation for the firms that get relief, and no equity share for the 
government in exchange for this massive infusion of capital.  Both Obama and 
McCain have opposed the provision denying any judicial review of decisions 
made by Paulson . . . .” 
Id. 
49 Kuttner reported: 
House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank said he would 
want to add several features to the Paulson plan, including relief for homeowners, 
a new stimulus package, and limits on CEO compensation.  Said Frank, “It would 
be a grave mistake to say that we’re going to buy up the bad debt that resulted 
from the bad decisions of these [private sector] people and then allow them to get 
millions of dollars on the way out. . . . It’s kind of hard to tell the average 
American that we’re going to continue to have foreclosures that destabilize 
neighborhoods and deprive cities of revenues they need, but we’re going to buy 
up the [banks’] bad paper.” 
Id. 
50 Jennifer Parker of ABC News reported that Alabama Senator Richard Shelby, the most senior 
member of the Banking Committee, was very hesitant about the plan’s success.  Jennifer Parker, Bush 
Administration Tells Congress to Act Quickly or Risk Recession, ABC NEWS Sept. 23, 2008, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/PersonalFinance/Story?id=5865241&page=1.  Senator Shelby stated, 
“We have got to look at some alternatives.”  Id. at 1.  Shelby further stated, “I have long opposed 
government bailouts for individuals and corporate America alike.”  Id. at 2.  He continued, “We have 
been given no credible assurances that this plan will work.  We could very well send $700 billion, or a 
trillion, and not resolve the crisis.”  Id.  Representative Joe Barton of Texas disagreed with the proposal 
of adding to the ever-increasing national debt: “I’m kind of an old- fashioned guy, and I think we ought 
to pay for what we do as a government, but instead we’re talking about adding $1.5 trillion to our 
national debt and forcing our children to pay the cost.”  Kevin G. Hall & Dave Montgomery, Senate 
Passes $810 Billion Economic Bailout, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/ 
congress/story/53357.html. 
51 See Ward, supra note 13. 
52 The Senate unanimously confirmed Paulson’s appointment as Treasury Secretary in 2006.  See 
United States Department of the Treasury, http://www.ustreas.gov/education/history/secretaries/hm 
paulson.shtml (last visited Feb. 8, 2009). 
Before coming to Treasury, Paulson was Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 
of Goldman Sachs since the firm’s initial public offering in 1999. He joined 
Goldman Sachs Chicago Office in 1974 and rose through the ranks holding 
several positions including, Managing Partner of the firm’s Chicago office, Co-
head of the firm’s investment Banking Division, President and Chief Operating 
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would require Congress to place an enormous amount of trust also in an unknown 
person, as it would grant power that would carry through to the Treasury Secretary 
of the next administration.53   
As significant as this opposition was, Paulson’s greatest critics quickly 
appeared to be free-market conservative Republicans, as they were mortified by 
the massive market intervention.54  Even with the full support of President Bush, it 
appeared that Republicans were not going to support the plan.55  Seeing that the 
momentum was breaking down, Vice President called a special meeting with 
House Republicans on September 25th to try to rally support for Paulson’s 
proposal.56  The meeting was a failure, ending with only more contentions between 
                                                          
Officer, and Co-Senior partner.  Prior to joining Goldman Sachs, Paulson was a 
member of the White House Domestic Council, serving as Staff Assistant to the 
President from 1972 to 1973, and as Staff Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense at the Pentagon from 1970 to 1972. 
Id. 
53 Ward, supra note 13.  Ward reported that,  
The concern from some critics is not with Mr. Paulson, whom they view as 
focused on fixing the economic crisis. Their worry is what happens after Mr. 
Paulson leaves.   
Mr. Paulson will not likely remain as Treasury secretary under the next 
administration, even if he is kept on board for a few months during the transition, 
as Democratic presidential nominee Sen. Barack Obama has said he might do. 
That makes the next person to hold these extraordinary powers - which last for 
two years - an unknown quantity.   
“We’re going to hand these powers off to someone we don’t even know. And 
that’s a wild card to me,” said Jim Rickards, who served a decade ago as general 
counsel for Long Term Capital Management, a hedge fund whose failure in the 
late 1990s required a bailout by other banks and financial firms. 
Id. at 3. 
54 See Fitzgerald, supra note 24.  A group of free-market Republicans known as the Republican 
Study Committee agreed upon the “Ten Conservative Concerns With The Treasury Bailout,” an 
alternative that “included suspending the capital gains tax, ending mark-to-market accounting rules and 
privatizing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.”  Id.  For a copy of the Ten Conservative Concerns with the 
Treasury Bailout, see TCCTB, http://www.house.gov/hensarling/rsc/doc/092308_10conservconcerns 
bailout.pdf.   
55 Several Republicans even began bringing plans of their own, some of which looked like 
diametric opposites of Paulson’s strategy.  See Fitzgerald, supra note 24.  “[A] group of House 
Republicans led by Representative Eric Cantor of Virginia circulated an alternate plan calling for Wall 
Street firms to buy insurance on mortgage- backed securities while cutting taxes and relaxing 
regulation.”  Id.  The Republicans plan was just one of many alternatives proposed by political and 
economic leaders.  Senator Hillary Clinton proposed the Home Owner Loan Corporation (HOLC), a 
plan that would focus on rebuilding the economy by allowing homeowner’s to avoid foreclosure as had 
been done during the 1930’s Great Depression.  See Hillary Rodham Clinton, Let’s Keep People in their 
Homes, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2008, at A19, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12223 
0767702474045.html.  Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Managing Director of the International Monetary 
Fund, recommended a similar approach to Paulson’s in focusing upon “liquidity provision; purchase of 
distressed assets; and capital injections into financial institutions.”  Dominique Strauss-Kahn, A 
Systematic Crisis Demands Systematic Solutions, Sept. 22, 2008, at http://www.imf.org/external/ 
np/vc/2008/092208.htm.  Financial investment leader Warren Buffet agreed to an extent with Paulson’s 
bailout plan; however, he urged that the Federal Government must buy the “troubled assets” of financial 
institutions at the market price rather than Paulson’s proposed “hold-to-maturity” as the maturity price 
was unrealistically favorable to banks.  Henry Blodget, Even Warren Buffet Agrees: Bernanke Bailout 
Price Plan a Joke, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 24, 2008, at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/henry-
blodget/even-warren-buffett-agree_b_128919.html. 
56 Fitzgerald, supra note 24. 
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Republicans.57 
Another meeting was held later on September 25th between Congressional 
leaders at the White House to discuss the status of Paulson’s proposal.58  Staff 
members and aides of the representatives reported that when House minority 
leader John Boehner stated that “House Republicans were not on board . . . [t]he 
meeting erupted in shouting.”59  It was reported that as: 
[T]he meeting broke up and participants stormed out, Paulson followed 
[Democratic Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee Barney Frank] 
and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi.  Paulson, pleading with Pelosi to keep the deal 
alive in spite of the partisanship, got down on one knee and begged her to push 
on . . . .60 
With tensions high within both parties, House Democrats put the proposal to 
a vote as an amendment to HR 3997 on September 29th.61  Several Paulson 
supporters were optimistic, including President Bush, but as a large number of  
‘no’ votes began coming in, it was apparent that the amendment would fail.62  Both 
Democratic and Republican leaders continued to plead with party members to pass 
the plan, as the vote was held open for forty minutes, “nearly triple the usual 
[fifteen] minutes” allotted for voting.63  “Pelosi could be seen on the floor pleading 
with fellow Democrats Bennie Thompson and Jesse Jackson Jr. to change their 
‘no’ votes to ‘yes.’  Thompson repeatedly shook his head ‘no’ at the speaker.  
When the gavel went down, the bill fell [twelve] votes short.”64  The Dow Jones 
Industrial Average fell nearly 500 points during the vote alone, finally closing the 
day down 777 points.65   
As financial markets continued to fall, the Senate took Paulson’s proposal to 
vote on October 1st as the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (“EESA”) of 
2008, an amendment to HR 1424.66  The Senate passed the bill with overwhelming 
approval seventy-four to twenty-five.67  Many members of the Senate believed that 
the bill would pass on House vote as two “sweeteners” were added to motivate 
votes from numerous constituencies: “a tax cut and extended federal protection for 
                                                          
57 Id.  Fitzgerald reported that “Indiana Republican Mike Pence said it was ‘very evident’ after the 
meeting that ‘there is a growing discontent among Republicans.’’’  Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Fitzgerald, supra note 24. 
62 Id. 
Congressman Michael Conaway, a Texas Republican, waited to see where the 
vote was going as he tried to decide. An accountant by training, he said he 
understood the risks posed by securities backed by foreclosed mortgages, yet still 
opposed bailing out those responsible for them. One of the last to vote, he said he 
stood in front of the machine with a hand on both the “yes” and “no” buttons and 
paused. After a moment, he pressed “no.” 
Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Fitzgerald, supra note 24. 
67 Ron Haruni, U.S. Senate Passes Economic Bailout Bill, WALL STREET PIT, Oct. 1, 2008, 
available at http://wallstreetpit.com/2008/10/senate-passes-economic-bailout-bill/.  
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bank deposits . . . .”68  Furthermore, numerous measures of oversight had been 
added to the original proposal in addition to striking the ‘no review’ clause.69  The 
bill returned to the House for a vote on October 3rd and passed 263-171, 
undoubtedly to Paulson’s great relief.70  After two weeks of excruciating 
negotiations, Paulson’s once clear-cut two and a half page proposal now stood as 
the EESA,71 a “450 page [statute,] laden with tax breaks and other measures 
unrelated to the crisis.”72  Even so, the essence of Paulson’s $700 billion capped 
bailout proposal was now law.73 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE EESA AND THE POWER THAT WAS 
AUTHORIZED TO TREASURY SECRETARY HENRY PAULSON 
The amendment to HR 1424 was the 450-page manifestation of the two 
weeks of hard political negotiations that followed Paulson’s initial bailout 
proposal.  Paulson’s two and a half page proposal, concise and pure in its purpose 
to address the financial and economic crises through a broad bailout, became the 
bulletin board on which hundreds of political add-ons were pinned.  However, as 
convoluted as it was, still lying beneath the blanket of both conservative and liberal 
flavored add-ons was the beating heart of a monumental $700 billion bailout plan 
to be managed by Paulson.  Thus, underneath the political mess and chains of 
oversight was a grant of extreme power.  As many have argued, the EESA may 
have made Henry Paulson not only the most powerful Treasury Secretary to date, 
but also perhaps one of the most power political officers in American history. 
                                                          
68 Fitzgerald, supra note 24.  Many considered the new bill to have actually been an $810 billion 
bailout as another $110 billion in tax breaks was further provided for businesses and individuals.  See 
Hall, supra note 50.  
69 See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 
(2008). 
The White House said layers of oversight have been added in the . . . two weeks 
of negotiations to ensure transparency and integrity in the process.  [White House 
spokesman Tony Fratto stated that,] “[t]he government has nuclear programs that 
don’t have as much oversight, reporting and surveillance . . . [Whereas] [t]he bill 
will give the Treasury secretary ‘a lot of decision-making authority,” there will 
be an “unprecedented amount of oversight and supervision . . . 
Ward, supra note 13. 
70 See Dave Burdick, House Bailout Bill Friday Vote: YEA – 263, NAY – 171, HUFFINGTON POST, 
Oct. 2, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/10/02/house-bailout-vote-encore_n_131222.html. 
71 See Draft Proposal, supra note 8. 
72 Fitzgerald, supra note 24.   
73 Stephen S. Kudenholdt, Summary and Analysis of the Troubled Asset Relief Program, Order No. 
14108, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE COMMERCIAL LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 
305 (Practising Law Institute, 2008).  
The initial plan that Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson submitted to Congress 
was short and simple. It gave Secretary Paulson $700 billion and the authority to 
use all of the tools of the capital markets to remove distressed assets from 
institutional balance sheets and to manage, workout, finance, repackage and sell 
those assets, without the constraints of mark-to-market accounting, capital 
charges, credit concerns or other impediments to private institutions. Although 
Congress greatly expanded the final bill, with a few significant exceptions, the 
Secretary has retained the broad authority that he requested. 
Id.   
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The general purpose of the entire HR 1424 amendment was: 
To provide authority for the Federal Government to purchase and insure 
certain types of troubled assets for the purposes of providing stability to and 
preventing disruption in the economy and financial system and protecting 
taxpayers, to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide 
incentives for energy production and conservation, to extend certain expiring 
provisions, to provide individual income tax relief, and for other purposes.74 
As the EESA was the amendment’s most powerful tool to accomplish this 
general purpose, the Act had a much more specific purpose: 
(1) to immediately provide authority and facilities that the Secretary of the Treasury 
can use to restore liquidity and stability to the financial system of the United States; 
and 
(2) to ensure that such authority and such facilities are used in a manner that— 
(A) protects home values, college funds, retirement accounts, and life 
savings; 
(B) preserves homeownership and promotes jobs and economic growth; 
(C) maximizes overall returns to the taxpayers of the United States; and 
(D) provides public accountability for the exercise of such authority.75 
In essence, Congress acted to: (1) equip the Treasury Secretary with broad 
and powerful tools (such as the $700 billion capped bailout and authority to further 
insure/guaranty other assets) in order to restabilize the United States financial 
system; and (2) guide the use of such powers for the mutual benefit of businesses 
and individual taxpayers alike through oversight and public accountability. 
A. Paulson’s Authority under the EESA 
The main ‘authority and facility’ given to Paulson under the EESA was the 
power to establish the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) as a vehicle for a 
$700 billion capped bailout plan.76  Under the TARP, Paulson could establish the 
“Office of Financial Stability”77 in order “to purchase, and to make and fund 
                                                          
74 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008). 
 
75 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, div. A, § 2, 122 Stat. 3765, 3766 
(2008). 
76 Kudenholdt, supra note 73, at 309-10. 
The centerpiece of the Program is the Secretary’s ability to purchase troubled 
assets from ailing financial institutions in an attempt to stem the write-downs and 
losses being taken by such institutions. By establishing ‘market’ prices for 
troubled assets and providing liquidity to the market, the Program also seeks to 
encourage private participants to begin purchasing mortgage related and other 
structured products as well. 
Id. 
77 Although Paulson is given the authority to manage the overall TARP, the EESA required that 
the Office of Financial Stability “be headed by an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, appointed by the 
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commitments to purchase, troubled assets78 from any financial institution, on such 
terms and conditions as are determined by the [Treasury] Secretary, and in 
accordance with [other provisions of the EESA] and the policies and procedures 
developed and published by the Secretary.”79  Paulson’s authority under TARP 
allowed him to immediately purchase $250 billion of troubled assets to be held 
outstanding without any further authorization from Congress.80  Paulson could then 
raise the limit of outstanding troubled assets to $350 billion upon the President 
submitting “a written certification” to Congress indicating “that the Secretary 
needs to exercise [such] authority.”81  The final step of authorized power allowed 
Paulson to double the limit of outstanding troubled assets owned by the federal 
government to $700 billion with another “written report” submitted to Congress by 
the President.82   
Upon establishing the TARP, Paulson was additionally authorized to 
guaranty and insure other troubled assets (and set the premiums for such 
guarantees) with only minor limitations.83  Thus, within only the first few pages of 
the EESA, Congress anointed Paulson with the power to directly intervene in the 
financial market to the extent of purchasing $700 billion of financially “troubled” 
assets (and indeed to have a greater effect than $700 billion as Paulson could also 
insure/guaranty even more assets).   
Paulson’s intervention power became even greater when he was given broad 
authority to manage these programs and the assets they purchased.  First, as to 
management of the programs themselves, EESA section 101(c) granted Paulson 
the primary execution authority to take actions that he deemed were “necessary to 
carry out the authorities” in the EESA.84  Section 101(c) went on to provide a brief, 
yet substantial, list of just a few of these powers of execution.85  Paulson had the 
                                                          
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”  Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, 
Pub. L. No. 110-343, div. A, tit. I, § 101(a)(3)(A), 122 Stat. 3765, 3767 (2008). 
78 “Troubled assets” were considered to be any “residential or commercial mortgages and any 
securities, obligations, or other instruments that are based on or related to such mortgages, that in each 
case was originated or issued on or before March 14, 2008, the purchase of which the Secretary 
determines promotes financial market stability . . .”  § 3(9)(A), 122 Stat. at 3767.  Additionally, a 
“troubled asset” could be “any other financial instrument that the Secretary, after consultation with the 
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, determines the purchase of which 
is necessary to promote financial market stability . . .”  § 3(9)(B), 122 Stat. at 3767.  Kudenholdt notes 
that although section 3(9)(A) focused on a particular group of securities, section 3(9)(B) allowed 
Paulson to include many other types of financial assets in the Program after consultation with the 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and notice to Congress.  Kudenholdt, supra note 73, at 308. 
79 Emergency Econ. Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, div. A, tit. I, § 101(a)(1), 122 Stat. 
3765, 3767 (2008) (emphasis added). 
80 § 115(a)(1), 122 Stat. at 3780. 
81 § 115(a)(2), 122 Stat. at 3780. 
82 § 115(a)(3), 122 Stat. at 3780.  The “written report” required more than just Presidential 
certification.  The report was required to “[d]etail the plan of the Secretary to exercise the authority.”  
Id.  The power to raise the outstanding troubled asset limit to $700 billion does not actually become 
effective until fifteen days after the President submits the written report, so long as a joint resolution 
opposed to the report is not filed within this time period.  Id. 
83 §102(a)(1)-(2), 122 Stat. at 3768-69.   
84 § 101(c), 122 Stat. at 3768.  
85 EESA section 101(c)’s list of powers to carry the bailout into effect was not a limitation on any 
other power Paulson might deem necessary.  “The Secretary is authorized to take such actions as the 
Secretary deems necessary to carry out the authorities in this Act, including, without limitation, the 
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direct authority to hire and manage employees that would administer the TARP.86  
In purchasing or guarantying troubled assets, Paulson had the authority to enter 
into contracts on behalf of the Federal Government and to further designate 
“financial institutions as financial agents of the Federal Government.”87   
In the spirit of “[minimizing] cost to taxpayers” for the management of the 
extensive amount of assets to be held by the TARP, Congress further authorized 
Paulson the “flexibility” to create financial agents of his own to “purchase, hold, 
and sell troubled assets and issue obligations.”88  Importantly, Congress did not 
restrict the number or type of financial “vehicles” that Paulson could establish.89  
Finally, in order to make sure that Paulson’s executive powers were truly 
complete, Congress then broadly authorized Paulson to issue “such regulations and 
other guidance as may be necessary or appropriate to define terms or carry out the 
authorities or purposes of” the EESA.90   
Second, in addition to such administrative authority over the program itself, 
Paulson was further given broad powers to manage the hundreds of billions of 
dollars worth of troubled assets that were purchased through the EESA’s 
application.  EESA section 106(b) stated that Paulson “. . . shall have authority to 
manage troubled assets purchased under this Act, including revenues and portfolio 
risks therefrom.”91  Additionally, section 106(a) stated that Paulson may “. . . at 
any time, exercise any rights received in connection with troubled assets purchased 
under this Act.”92  Paulson was essentially given the complete authoritative control 
over managing the funds acquired so that he could sell or reinvest such funds to 
maximize return on the taxpayer’s investment.93   
Whereas Paulson was given other powers throughout the EESA, the most 
consequential were these powers to execute and manage the likely $700 billion 
                                                          
following . . .”  Id. (emphasis added).  As the Kudenholdt observes, “[o]nce purchased, troubled assets 
may be managed, financed and sold as the Secretary sees fit.”  Kudenholdt, supra note 73, at 307. 
86 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, div. A, tit. I, § 101(c)(1), 122 Stat. 
3765, 3768 (2008). 
87 §§ 101(c)(2)-(3), 122 Stat. at 3768. 
88 § 101(c)(4), 122 Stat. at 3768. 
89 Paulson’s freedom to establish such financial “vehicles” was further broadened by the Federal 
Government’s further freedom from tax constraint and liability.  As Kudenholdt notes,  
[Paulson] will not have to consider the tax, limitation of liability and bankruptcy 
issues that private institutions must consider when forming entities to hold assets. 
As a result, the form of vehicle used will likely relate more to convenience, 
flexibility and suitability for the assets being held and the types of obligations 
that may be issued. In some of the recent transactions with troubled financial 
institutions, the Federal Reserve Bank has utilized limited liability companies 
(where private parties shared an interest in the acquired assets) and pass-through 
trusts. 
Kudenholdt, supra note 73, at 315. 
90 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, div. A, tit. I, § 101(c)(5), 122 Stat. 
3765, 3768 (2008). 
91 § 106(b), 122 Stat. at 3773. 
92 § 106(a), 122 Stat. at 3773 (emphasis added). 
93 See § 106(c), 122 Stat. at 3773 (“The Secretary may, at any time, upon terms and conditions and 
at a price determined by the Secretary, sell, or enter into securities loans, repurchase transactions, or 
other financial transactions in regard to, any troubled asset purchased under this Act.”); § 113(a)(2), 122 
Stat. at 3778 (“. . . the Secretary shall hold the assets to maturity or for resale for and until such time as 
the Secretary determines that the market is optimal for selling such assets . . .”) 
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bailout of troubled institutions in the United States financial market.  However, as 
part two of the EESA purpose expressed, these powers were given to Paulson with 
strong guidance and oversight.  As members of Congress went to great length to 
guide and hedge the broad powers given to Paulson, it is important to view 
Paulson’s authority over the bailout plan in the context of the EESA’s oversight 
provisions. 
B. Congressional Guidance of Paulson’s Authority 
Congress understood that Paulson needed broad and flexible powers in order 
for the bailout to be most effective and efficient in addressing the financial crisis.  
Even so, Congress did not want to hand over the keys to the $700 billion vault 
without at least giving Paulson some small bit of advice on how to spend it.  Like 
the father who cannot help but give his teenager one last lecture of guidance before 
handing over the keys to the car, Congress delivered section 103’s 
“considerations” for Paulson to review before ‘punching’ the brand new bailout 
vehicle’s gas pedal. 
Congress reminded Paulson to protect taxpayer interests in seeking 
maximum return to seek stability for financial markets and prevent further 
disturbance, “to help families keep their homes,” to remember the towns and 
counties that have been affected, and to protect American “jobs, savings, and 
retirement security.”94  Congress further urged Paulson to think in the long-term 
when investing, to ensure that the TARP would not discriminate against certain 
financial institutions, to remember smaller institutions that serve low to moderate-
income areas, and to consider the “utility of purchasing other real estate owned and 
instruments backed by mortgages on multifamily properties . . .”95 
C. Oversight of Paulson’s Authority  
Of course, Congress had not left $700 billion in Paulson’s hands on guidance 
alone.  For as much as Congress had granted immense power to Paulson in the 
EESA, it also set up several substantial measures of disclosure,96 limitation,97 
                                                          
94 See §§ 103(1)-(3), (7), (9), 122 Stat. at 3770. 
95 See §§ 103(4)-(6), (9), 122 Stat. at 3770.  Congress further provided Paulson with outside 
guidance under section 101(b) by requiring him to “consult with the [Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System], [Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation], Comptroller of the Currency, Director of 
the Office of Thrift Supervision, Chairman of the National Credit Union Administration Board, and the 
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development” when exercising his authority under the EESA.  § 
101(b), 1222 Stat. at 3768. 
96 Congress required Paulson to disclose more specifics about how the program would work 
through publishing the “program guidelines.” § 101(d), 122 Stat. 3768.  Paulson’s “program guidelines” 
had to disclose: (1) mechanisms for purchasing troubled assets; (2) methods for pricing and valuing 
troubled assets; (3) procedures for selecting asset managers; and (4) criteria for identifying troubled 
assets for purchase.  Id. 
97 One of the most important measures of limitation upon Paulson’s power was duration.  § 120(a), 
122 Stat. at 3788.  Section 120(a) stated that all of the “authorities provided [to Paulson] under sections 
101(a), excluding section 101(a)(3), and 102 shall terminate on December 31, 2009.”  Id.  Either 
Paulson or the next Treasury Secretary could have however extended such authority nearly another year 
by submitting a written certification for extension to Congress.  § 120(b), 122 Stat. at 3788 (which 
allowed for an extension to last no later than two “years from the date of enactment of [the EESA]”).  
The subsequently appointed Secretary Tim Geithner was required to include in such a certification a 
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accountability,98 and oversight to check Paulson’s exercise of such power.  The 
two major instruments of oversight used by Congress were oversight boards.  The 
first of these boards was the Financial Stability Oversight Board (“FSOB”) 
established by EESA section 104. 99  The FSOB’s primary purposes included 
reviewing the exercise of power taken by Paulson under the TARP, making 
recommendations to Paulson concerning future exercises of power, and reporting 
“any suspected fraud, misrepresentation, or malfeasance to the Special Inspector 
General for the [TARP] or the Attorney General of the United States.”100  The 
FSOB also retained the authority to “ensure” that Paulson’s continuing policies for 
the TARP were: (1) congruent with the Congress’ stated purposes for the EESA; 
(2) “in the economic interests of the United States;” and (3) “consistent with 
protecting taxpayers.”101  Additionally, the FSOB had the option of creating a 
Credit Review Committee to further evaluate Paulson’s exercise of power in 
purchasing troubled assets.102 
The second oversight board instituted by the EESA was the Congressional 
Oversight Panel (“COP”)103 established by section 125.104  The duty of the COP 
was to continually “review the current state of the financial markets and the 
regulatory system” and submit several reports105 to Congress on its findings.106  
                                                          
“justification of why the extension is necessary to assist American families and stabilize financial 
markets, as well as the expected cost to the taxpayers for such an extension.”  Id. 
98 In addition to numerous measures of oversight, Paulson was required to further submit several of 
his own reports to Congress concerning the exercise of his newly granted authority under the bailout 
plan.  First, Paulson was required to submit an extensive report to various Congressional committees 
every thirty days which includes: (1) an overview of the actions he has taken in connection with his 
EESA authority; (2) “obligations and expenditures” of section 118 funding since the last report with an 
estimated projection for the next period; and (3) a “detailed financial statement” that meticulously 
discloses the details of all financial actions taken by Paulson under his EESA authority.  § 105(a), 122 
Stat. at 3771-72.  Paulson was required to further submit a “Tranche” report to Congress every time the 
TARP breached a new $50 billion plateau of purchased assets.  § 105(b), 122 Stat. at 3772.  Along with 
all of this, Paulson was required to provide a justification with every report for the prices the TARP was 
paying.  Id.  Paulson was also required to submit a “regulatory modernization report” to Congress by 
April 30, 2009.  §105(c), 122 Stat. at 3772.  This report was required to analyze “the current state of the 
regulatory system and its effectiveness at overseeing the participants in the financial markets, including 
the over-the-counter swaps market and government-sponsored enterprises, and providing 
recommendations for improvement . . .”  Id at 3772-73. 
99 § 104(a), 122 Stat. at 3770.  The FSOB is a five member board comprised of the: (1) Chairman 
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System;(2) Treasury Secretary; (3) Director of the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency; (4) Chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission; and (5) 
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. § 104(b), 122 Stat. at 3771. 
100 § 104(a), 122 Stat. at 3770. 
101 § 104(e), 122 Stat. at 3771. 
102 § 104(f), 122 Stat. at 3771. 
103 The COP is a five member board comprised of : (1) one member appointed by the Speaker of 
the House of Representatives; (2) one member appointed by the minority leader of the House of 
Representatives; (3) one member appointed by the majority leader of the Senate; (4) one member 
appointed by the minority leader of the Senate; and (5) one member appointed by the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives and the majority leader of the Senate, “after consultation with the minority 
leader of the Senate and the minority leader of the House of Representatives.” § 125(c)(1), 122 Stat. at 
3792. 
104 § 125, 122 Stat. at 3791-92. 
105 The COP was required to provide “general reports” to Congress every thirty days pertaining to 
the use, impact, and effectiveness of Paulson’s power under the EESA.  §125(b)(1)(A), 122 Stat. at 
3791.  The COP was further required to submit a “special report on regulatory reform” to Congress by 
no later than January 20, 2009: 
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The COP was given several powers in order to fulfill its duty as the panel could: 
(1) hold hearings with the authority to receive evidence and sworn testimony; (2) 
enlist agents; and (3) obtain direct information from any department or agency of 
the United States.107 
In addition to these two oversight boards, Congress also anointed two 
governmental officials with the authorization to personally oversee how Paulson 
exercised his powers under the EESA.  The first of these officials was the 
Comptroller General of the United States.  EESA section 116(a) authorized the 
Comptroller General to conduct “ongoing oversight” of literally every component 
of Paulson’s execution of the TARP.108  The Comptroller General could 
investigate all “activities and performance of the TARP and of any agents and 
representatives of the TARP . . . including vehicles established by the 
Secretary.”109  In addition to this general oversight power, the Comptroller General 
could further “audit the programs, activities, receipts, expenditures, and financial 
transactions of the TARP and any agents and representatives of the TARP . . . 
including vehicles established by the Secretary.”110  Congress ordered Paulson to 
do much more than just submit to such extensive oversight.  EESA section 116 
required Paulson to allow constant Comptroller “presence,” as Paulson had to 
provide the Comptroller General sufficient “space and facilities” within the 
Treasury Department to conduct the oversight.111  If that weren’t enough, Congress 
further ordered the Treasury Department to pay the bill of its own oversight as 
EESA section 116(a)(2)(C) stated that “[t]he Treasury shall reimburse the 
Government Accountability Office for the full cost of any such oversight activities 
as billed therefor by the Comptroller General.”112 
                                                          
[A]nalyzing the current state of the regulatory system and its effectiveness at 
overseeing the participants in the financial system and protecting consumers, and 
providing recommendations for improvement, including recommendations 
regarding whether any participants in the financial markets that are currently 
outside the regulatory system should become subject to the regulatory system, the 
rationale underlying such recommendation, and whether there are any gaps in 
existing consumer protections.   
§ 125(b)(2), 122 Stat. at 3792. 
106 § 125(b), 122 Stat. at 3791-92. 
107 § 125(e), 122 Stat. at 3793. 
108 § 116(a), 122 Stat. at 3783. 
109 Id.  Similar to the COP, the Comptroller General was required to continually investigate 
whether Paulson’s performance under the TARP met the purposes of the EESA in advancing 
foreclosure mitigation, cost reduction, stability in financial markets, and protection of taxpayers.  § 
116(a)(1)(A), 122 Stat. at 3783.  The Comptroller General was to evaluate “[t]he financial condition 
and internal controls of the TARP” along with the characteristics of its purchases, obligations, and 
disposition of assets.  § 116(a)(1)(B)-(D), 122 Stat. at 3784.  Additionally, the Comptroller General was 
required to monitor the TARP’s operations efficiency, compliance with all other laws, efforts in 
avoiding conflicts of interest among agents and representatives, and “efficacy of contracting procedures 
pursuant to section 107(b).”  § 116(a)(1)(E)-(H), 122 Stat. at 3784.  While “overseeing” the TARP, the 
Comptroller General was given complete access to all TARP related information.  § 116(a)(2)(B), 122 
Stat. at 3784. 
110 § 116(b)(2), 122 Stat. at 3785.  Whereas the Comptroller General had the general power to audit 
upon discretion, he or she was required to conduct at least one annual audit per year.  § 116(b)(1), 122 
Stat. at 3785.  The Comptroller General’s annual audit required the TARP to “prepare and issue to the 
appropriate committees of Congress and the public audited financial statements.”  Id. 
111 § 116(a)(2)(A), 122 Stat. at 3784. 
112 § 116(a)(2)(C), 122 Stat. at 3785. 
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The Comptroller General was not the only official keeping a personal eye 
upon Paulson’s exercise of power in the TARP.  Congress concurrently established 
the “Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program.”113  The Inspector General had the authority to investigate and audit the 
“purchase, management, and sale of assets by the Secretary of the Treasury under 
any program established by the Secretary under section 101, and the management 
by the Secretary of any program established under section 102 . . .”114  The 
Inspector General could be involved in the oversight of every troubled asset 
Paulson purchased under the bailout plan, as among the articles of information the 
Inspector General was required to report to Congress115 was “an explanation of the 
reasons the Secretary deemed it necessary to purchase each such troubled asset.”116  
Similar to the Comptroller General, Congress did not stop at just requiring Paulson 
to submit to the official’s oversight.  EESA section 121(g) required Paulson to 
allocate $50 million of the funding set aside for his use under EESA section 118 to 
provide funding for the Inspector General to fulfill the oversight duties.117 
In addition to these major instruments of oversight, Congress also hedged 
Paulson’s exercise of power by installing a measure of judicial review in EESA 
section 119, effectively scrapping the “no review” clause from Paulson’s 
proposal.118  EESA section 119(a)(1) subjected Paulson’s exercise of power to the 
general judicial review provisions provided in “chapter seven of title 5 [of the] 
United States Code” and directed the adjudicator to find and set aside any of 
Paulson’s actions “. . . that are found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or not in accordance with law.”119  Even though this highly sought-after 
judicial review existed in Congress’ final grant of power to Paulson, there was 
significant debate over whether it is a true check on his authority as EESA section 
119 also provided substantial limitations on the types of parties that can bring 
suit120 and more importantly upon the equitable relief that may be granted.121 
                                                          
113 § 121(a), 122 Stat. at 3788. 
114 § 121(c), 122 Stat. at 3788-89 (emphasis added). 
115 The Inspector General was required to collect and summarize information such as the complete 
listings of every purchased troubled asset, the names of each financial institution that sold the assets, a 
detailed biography of every “person or entity hired to manage such troubled assets,” and a list of all 
insurance contracts that have been issued by Paulson under section 102.  §§ 121(c)(1)(B), (D)-(E), (G), 
122 Stat. at 3788-89.  The Inspector General was also required to keep a current estimate of the “total 
amount of troubled assets purchased” by any section 101 program.  § 121(c)(1)(F), 122 Stat. at 3789.  
The Inspector General is broadly equipped to acquire such information by sections 121(c)(2), 121(d), 
and 121(e). 
116 § 121(c)(1)(C), 122 Stat. at 3789 (emphasis added). 
117 § 121(g), 122 Stat. at 3790. 
118 See Draft Proposal, supra note 8. 
119 § 119(a)(1), 122 Stat. at 3787. 
120 Section 119(a)(3)’s “limitations on actions by participating companies” provided that “[n]o 
action or claims may be brought against the Secretary by any person that divests its assets with respect 
to its participation in a program under” under the EESA.  The only exception to this limitation was if 
Paulson were to waive the limitation expressly in a contract with the company or individual.  § 
119(a)(3), 122 Stat. at 3787. 
121 The major limitation on equitable relief against Paulson was EESA section 119(a)(2)(A): “. . . 
no injunction or other form of equitable relief shall be issued against the Secretary for actions pursuant 
to section 101, 102, 106, and 109, other than to remedy a violation of the Constitution.”  David Zaring, 
blogger for the Conglomerate, believed that this limitation effectively canceled out the judicial review.  
See David Zaring, Judicial Review in the Bailout Bill, Oct. 2, 2008, http://www.theconglomerate.org/ 
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D. Impact of Paulson’s Bailout Authority 
Given that the 2008 crisis was considered by many to have had “an 
unprecedented amount of uncertainty as to the extent of either its causes or 
effects,” the impact (or non-impact) of Paulson’s bailout authority will not truly be 
ascertainable for quite some time.122 
It may well be that the $700 billion bailout will calm the financial markets, be 
sufficient to prevent further collapses among insurers, banks and investment 
houses, and perhaps even prove to be far less costly to taxpayers than its $700 
billion price tag when assets acquired by the federal government . . . at steep 
discounts are later sold at a profit.  Such a ‘soft landing’ is far from certain, 
however. The bailout seeks to stabilize the financial and credit markets primarily by 
purchasing mortgage-backed securities, the worth of which is highly suspect.123 
E. Summary and Conclusion of Paulson’s Authority 
The EESA granted Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson tremendous authority 
to establish, execute, and manage a $700 billion capped bailout of the United 
States financial system.  His power was not only defined simply by the magnitude 
of its reach, but also by the enormity of the microscope that Congress continually 
hovered above him through the EESA’s extensive oversight.  All of this 
considered, there is no doubt that Paulson will be remembered as a historically 
powerful government official.   
Paulson was given great power to address a dire financial crisis, but in 
context, was he really the most powerful Treasury Secretary in United States 
history?  Was the scope of the authority given to Paulson under the EESA really an 
“unprecedented” leap by Congress?  The next section of this article will begin to 
show that the answer to these questions is no, as the section will define the genesis 
of a Congressional trend to magnify Treasury Secretary authority in times of 
financial crisis by examining the pattern’s first and truly most powerful proponent, 
Alexander Hamilton. 
IV. THE BEGINNING OF THE CONGRESSIONAL TREND TO MAGNIFY 
                                                          
2008/10/judicial-review.html.  Zaring stated that “it looks a bit like the bill provides for [arbitrary and 
capricious review] in one section, and then takes it away, by taking away equitable relief, in the other 
section.”  Id.  Zaring’s main contention was that the arbitrary and capricious review granted by EESA 
section 119(a) was itself considered to be an equitable relief by the Supreme Court.  Id. (citing Doe v. 
Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 619 n.1 (2004) (“referring to the ‘the general provisions for equitable relief within 
the Administrative Procedure Act’ and citing a section of the same Title 5, Chapter 7 referenced in the 
bailout bill’s judicial review provisions”)).  Zaring did not believe that “someone who thought that . . . 
Paulson underpaid for a particular mortgage backed security [could] sue . . .” under the arbitrary and 
capricious standard.  Id.  Zaring conceded however that some sort of declaratory judgment might be 
available to such a plaintiff in asserting that Paulson had made a sale that was plainly inconsistent with 
the EESA.  Id.  Either way, Zaring pointed out that under Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137 (1993), the 
Treasury Department could “use its broad powers to set up a mandatory administrative appeals process, 
which . . . would keep plaintiffs out of the courts until they had exhausted their administrative remedies, 
and which would give the courts an adjudicated process to look at (and, hopefully for Treasury, rubber 
stamp).”  Id. 
122 Alan C. Weinstein, Current and Future Challenges to Local Government Posed by the Housing 
and Credit Crisis, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 259, 271 (2009) (emphasis added). 
123 Id. at 271-72. 
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TREASURY SECRETARY AUTHORITY IN THE MIDST OF CRISIS: 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON (1789-1795) 
A. The Public Credit Crisis 
The infant United States presented newly elected President George 
Washington with a multitude of challenges upon his taking office in the spring of 
1789, none more complex and critical to the future of the Union then the state of 
the nation’s finances.  Fighting the War of Independence against England had 
caused the Continental Congress to retain debt from “. . . more creditors than any 
other government in the world.”124  The vast majority of the Revolutionary War 
debt, or as political leaders called it “the price of liberty,” had not yet been “settled 
since independence due to the ‘embarrassment of a defective constitution” under 
the Confederation.125  By 1789 the United States’ foreign debt totaled over $10 
million (with $1.6 million more in arrears of interest).126  The nation’s domestic 
debt, largely comprised of war certificates and bonds issued to former Continental 
soldiers and suppliers, amounted to more than $40 million with accrued interest.127  
All in all, the newly formed federal government was in a $50 million hole; a virtual 
anvil around the neck of its hopeful Constitution. 
Adding to the financial strain of the nation was the fact that the individual 
states also owed both domestic and foreign investors an aggregated $25 million,128 
which only a few states had made significant progress in paying.129  The size of the 
national and state debts was only the beginning of the problem however, as the 
organization and subsequent management of the domestic debt could be described 
as nothing short of chaotic.130  Furthermore, faith in the fledgling United States 
                                                          
124 JOHN C. MILLER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE GROWTH OF THE NEW NATION 230 
(Transaction Publishers 2004) (1959). 
125 MARIE B. HECHT, ODD DESTINY: THE LIFE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 180 (1982). 
126 MILLER, supra note 124, at 230. 
127 Id.  See also MARGARET G. MYERS, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 61 (1970). 
The total owed to individuals amounted to more than 40 million dollars. Of 
which about one-third was accrued interest.  Many of the certificates had 
originally been issued to pay soldiers and officers of the army; others had been 
given to farmers and merchants by commissary officers.  Many of the bonds had 
been purchased by patriotic investors who had later been obliged to sell them at a 
loss; some of the securities, like some certificates and warrants, had changed 
hands several times. 
Id. 
128 JACOB ERNEST COOKE, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 76 (1982). 
129 “Massachusetts and South Carolina had large unpaid obligations on the war account; North 
Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, and Georgia had paid off most of their war debts; the other states had less 
at stake.”  MYERS, supra note 127, at 61. 
130 See MILLER, supra note 124, at 230. 
The domestic debt consisted of a chaos of virtually worthless paper money; loan-
office certificates; IOU’s signed by the Quartermaster commissary generals; 
lottery prizes (the government had conducted lotteries but had been unable to pay 
the winners in cash); certificates given to soldiers and officers in lieu of pay; 
indents (paper certificates representing interest debt).  Hardly a means of going 
into debt known to the governments of the eighteenth century had been omitted 
by the Continental Congress . . . 
Id.  
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financial system was low and diminishing, significantly compounding the problem 
of borrowing and repayment.131   
Many historians believe that the success of Washington’s administration, and 
indeed the sustained future of the whole nation, rested upon how Washington 
addressed the nation’s mounting financial crisis.132  Washington turned to Robert 
Morris, former Superintendent of Finance under the Confederation, for guidance in 
asking, “[w]hat are we to do with this heavy debt?”133  Morris’ only answer for the 
President was a referral: “[t]here is but one man in the United States who can tell 
you; that is Alexander Hamilton.”134  Washington appointed Hamilton, his long-
time friend and confidant,135 to be the first Treasury Secretary of the United States 
on September 11, 1789. 136  Hamilton’s exercise of power in addressing the post-
Revolutionary financial crisis and further creating the initial American financial 
system has caused many to consider him to be the most influential, powerful, and 
indeed controversial Treasury Secretary in United States history.137 
The sheer size and nature of the national debt forced Hamilton to face a 
critical market intervention dilemma from the outset of his service.  Whereas the 
majority agreed that all foreign debt should be repaid, many wanted Hamilton to 
consider an arbitrary cancellation of the domestic debt altogether.138  In the face of 
national bankruptcy, the argument for canceling the domestic debt was supported 
                                                          
131  The United States’ revenue from taxation failed to even meet the interest of the government’s 
obligations.  Id. at 231.   Hamilton would later define the problem as a rather vicious cycle.  Id. at 230. 
Hamilton had always contended that the government could not endure without 
credit ‘commensurate with the utmost extent of the lending faculties of the 
community’; but credit could not be established until provision had been made 
for the existing debt.  Little could be done toward disposing of the existing debt, 
however, until the government had regained its ability to borrow.  Truly the 
finances of the United States were a dilemma wrapped in a paradox. 
Id. 
132 Cooke believed that “[t]he success of Washington’s administration largely hinged on its 
adoption of fiscal policies that would revive confidence in the fledgling nation, both at home and abroad 
. . .”  COOKE, supra note 128, at 73.  Miller further expressed that “[t]he success of the Constitution and 
the very existence of the republic depended upon the skill with which the financial obligations of the 
government were handled.”  MILLER, supra note 124, at 230. 
133 HECHT, supra note 125, at 177. 
134 Id. 
135 Hamilton served as Washington’s “chief of staff” and “principal and most confidential aide,” 
during the Revolutionary War.  RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 90, 91 (2004).  Washington 
considered Hamilton to be like a surrogate son during their time in the war, even referring to him as 
“my boy.”  Id. at 87. 
136 HECHT, supra note 125, at 177.  The Senate would go on to confirm Hamilton as the Treasury 
Secretary later that same day.  Id. 
137 See generally RICHARD B. MORRIS, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE FOUNDING OF A NATION 
285 (1957).  As to the founding of the initial American financial system: 
Hamilton came into Washington’s cabinet with a seven-point program: (1) the 
restoration of public credit; (2) a sound system of taxation; (3) a national bank; 
(4) a sound currency; (5) the promotion of commerce; (6) the encouragement of 
manufactures; and (7) a liberal immigration policy.  In his public papers he made 
it clear that the carrying out of this program was not to be at the expense of 
agriculture, but would result in the building of a balanced economy which would 
benefit all economic groups.  His program was brilliantly presented to the nation 
in a series of bold and masterful reports.  
Id.  
138 MILLER, supra note 124, at 231. 
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both by a basic call for national self-preservation and a rationale that the United 
States had in a sense already fulfilled a greater obligation to creditors in providing 
them with liberty through the defeat of England.139  Whereas Hamilton held that 
the federal government did have the power to cancel debt,140 he concluded that it 
would not be “just” to do so in this case as he sincerely believed that the United 
States could fulfill its debt obligations upon reform of policy.141 
Even though Hamilton had refused such an extreme measure, market 
intervention was still on his mind.  In October of 1789, only weeks after 
Hamilton’s appointment, Congress requested that Hamilton submit a proposal to 
address the public credit crisis.142  Hamilton responded two months later with his 
historic First Report on the Public Credit.143  Similar to Paulson, Hamilton 
submitted a three-part proposal144 involving measures of far-reaching market 
intervention that required Congress to give Hamilton and the Treasury Department 
a tremendous amount of power.145  First, Hamilton proposed that the Treasury 
Department, acting on behalf of the President, be authorized to borrow money and 
use excess tax revenue as necessary to pay down the entirety of the foreign debt 
owed to France, Holland, and Spain over the next fifteen years.146  This was the 
least controversial part of Hamilton’s plan as it was generally agreed that the 
priority for the United States was to protect its financial reputation with foreign 
nations.147 
Second, Hamilton proposed that the federal government address the domestic 
debt by allowing the Treasury Department to offer the speculators which held the 
controversial war bonds and certificates148 a redemption of their securities in 
                                                          
139 Id. 
140 “The highest law of the state, [Hamilton] admitted, was self-preservation; when its existence 
was at stake, a government could alter the terms of contracts, discriminate between various groups of 
creditors and declare its obligations null and void.”  Id. 
141 Id.  Hamilton expressed this belief in stating that if he were to “establish that a government may 
decline a provision for its debts, though able to make it . . . and you overthrow all public morality . . . 
You have anarchy, despotism, or what you please, but you have no just or regular government.”  Id. 
142 Id. at 231-32. 
143 MYERS, supra note 127, at 60. 
144 In sum, Hamilton’s report would seek to explain how “the debt could be paid, to whom it 
should be paid and what was to be done with the state debts dating from the Revolutionary War.”  
MILLER, supra note 124, at 232. 
145 MYERS, supra note 127, at 60-62. 
146 Id. at 60-61. 
147 Id. at 61. 
148 The majority of men who had been originally “paid” with the war certificates were veteran 
soldiers and suppliers of the Revolutionary War.  See generally MILLER, supra note 124, at 232-34.  
These veterans, and often their widows or orphans, were met with hard times after the war.  Id.  Many 
of them were forced by their circumstances to sell the war securities to speculators “often at a fraction 
their nominal value . . .”  Id. at 232.  Due to this sad situation, a widespread “equity” debate spread 
throughout Congress pertaining to who should be justly paid for the outstanding war certificates and 
bonds.  Congressman Aedanus Burke “proposed that a discrimination should be made between the 
original holders of the public securities and their assignees and that a scale of depreciation be prepared 
accordingly.”  HECHT, supra note 125, at 184.  James Madison, who would eventually become 
Hamilton’s greatest opponent in getting his report passed by Congress, joined Burke’s proposal, “even 
after Burke withdrew it . . .”  Id.  Madison would go on to later publicly criticize Hamilton on the 
Congressional floor for not discriminating against the speculators, “dwelling at length upon the plight of 
the widows, orphans and ex-soldiers who had been defrauded by unconscionable speculators.”  MILLER, 
supra note 124, at 240-41.  “What would it profit the federal government, [Madison] asked, if in 
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exchange for a new contract that reduced the interest that the government was 
obligated to pay.149  In essence, Hamilton proposed a bailout of the securities to 
further strengthen investor confidence, as the offer to buy them at face value was 
substantially higher than the securities’ market value before his report was 
submitted.150  Indeed, many of the speculators stood to gain nearly an eighty-five 
percent profit, as it was not unusual for financially troubled veterans to have sold 
their securities for fifteen cents on the dollar.151  New securities would be issued 
by the federal government to “. . .be exchanged for outstanding obligations at their 
specie value at the rate of 100 to 1.”152 
Similar to Paulson, Hamilton was proposing a wide scale bailout of the 
United States financial system to promote stability and attract further 
investment.153  However, with Hamilton, the scale in context was much larger.  
                                                          
gaining the rich, it lost the affections of the people – the certain consequence of permitting this ‘shower 
of gold’ to fall upon the rich alone?”  Id.  The situation looked even more repulsive as the government 
buyout of the speculators’ securities would in turn be paid for by the original veterans, as they would be 
forced to pay federal taxes covering the purchase.  The issue continued to boil over as many thought 
that rich northern speculators were particularly preying upon the poorer veterans of the south and “were 
urging refunding in order to obtain a huge unearned profit.”  See MYERS, supra note 127, at 61.  
Hamilton, a former veteran himself, put aside thoughts of the unfortunate situation to see the drastic 
financial consequences that would come from not honoring the correct holder of the security.  Id.  The 
security itself stated that “the amount thereon specified should be paid to the bearer, thereby creating, 
said Hamilton, a contractual relationship that made them as much the property of bona fied purchases 
‘as their houses or their lands, their hats or their coats.’”  Id.  The Continental Congress had previously 
assured foreign investors that purchased such securities that they would be paid as the securities’ 
holder.  Id.  “If the federal government now attempted to discriminate in the name of equity between 
different types of creditors, Hamilton was prepared to renounce all hope that foreigners would ever 
again trust their money to the perfidious republicans across the Atlantic.”  Id. 
149 “In exchange for the security afforded by the funding system, Hamilton proposed to take what 
he called ‘a stout Slice’ from the accrued interest owing the public creditors . . . Roughly, this deduction 
amounted to an interest rate of 41/2 instead of 6 per cent upon the national debt.”  MILLER, supra note 
124, at 236.  Two-thirds of the new deal would bear a six percent interest rate from 1791 as the final 
one-third would not begin accruing interest until 1800.  MYERS, supra note 127, at 61.  “The arrears of 
interest would be paid in securities bearing only [three] percent.” Id. 
150 As the government redemption, or bailout, of the securities became more certain, the prices to 
buy such securities skyrocketed to a twenty percent premium.  MYERS, supra note 127, at 62.   “Since 
1787 there had been much speculative buying and selling of Continental and Confederation certificates 
of indebtedness and bills of credit on the prospect that they might be redeemed by the new Federal 
government.  Speculation reached its climax while the funding program was under debate.”  MORRIS, 
supra note 137, at 286-87.  “Since Hamilton’s report had been submitted to Congress, the speculators 
had been busy buying all the securities in sight, even going to the length of chartering ships to carry 
their agents to the southern states before the news of Hamilton’s report reached that region.”  MILLER, 
supra note 124, at 239. 
151 JOHN S. PANCAKE, THOMAS JEFFERSON & ALEXANDER HAMILTON 161 (1974). 
152 MYERS, supra note 127, at 61. 
153 Jerry Bowyer of Forbes.com believed that Hamilton’s Report on Public Credit and Paulson’s 
bailout plan were exceedingly analogous. Jerry Bowyer, Ron Paul Vs. Alexander Hamilton, FORBES, 
Oct. 3, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/2008/10/03/bailout-constitutional-hamilton-oped-cx_jb_1003 
bowyer.html.  Bowyer explained that: 
[W]e’ve been here before. As George Washington was taking the oath of office, 
U.S. credit markets were in full meltdown. America faced a credit crisis in which 
debt obligations were being purchased by banking houses at [twenty-five] cents 
on the dollar. Paulson’s predecessor was a guy named Hamilton, and Bush’s 
predecessor was a guy named Washington.  Hamilton wrote up a plan (called 
“Report on the Public Credit”) in which he proposed that the Treasury 
department buy the troubled securities from the private sector, thus restoring the 
collapsing credit market . . . Hamilton’s case was simple. When any part of a 
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Congress and the media continually called the $700 billion bailout plan 
“unprecedented,” but if one looks closely at the Hamilton bailout, the context 
shows that Hamilton asked for a taxpayer funded program that represented 4/5 of 
the total national debt.154  In order for Paulson’s power under the bailout plan to 
truly be unprecedented, the EESA would needed to have capped the bailout plan at 
just over $8 trillion; more than eight times the current maximum.155  Hamilton had 
essentially asked for eight times the reach of Paulson’s power by only the second 
point of his proposal; and still, he was far from done. 
Third, and most controversially, Hamilton proposed a full-scale assumption, 
or rather a further bailout, of the states’ aggregated $25 million debt.156  At first 
glance this appeared to be a step in the wrong direction, as the bailout would raise 
the national debt by more than fifty percent to almost $80 million with interest 
included.157  However, Hamilton was confident that he could similarly proffer a 
bargain with the holders of the state obligations to cut interest rates because of the 
added confidence the new Constitution158 and his debt management system would 
provide their securities.159  With these lesser interest rates, Hamilton believed his 
debt management system would more than provide for steady repayment of the 
national debt through an established “Sinking Fund,” which would “receive 
                                                          
nation participates in a massive repudiation of debt, the creditworthiness of the 
whole nation is damaged. Hamilton saw this as a national problem in need of a 
national solution. He argued that the whole nation would benefit from a return to 
a well-functioning credit market, with low interest rates fueling growth.  
Hamilton believed that if the Constitution gave executive power to the president, 
then that included the authority to create specific institutions and programs 
necessary to exercise that power . . . . [T]he Treasury bought up the paper, 
America’s credit markets were restored quickly, and although we’ve had a few 
rough patches, the ensuing 218 years have gone pretty well so far. 
Id.   
154 The domestic debt represented stood at $40 of the $51.6 million national debt.  See MYERS, 
supra note 127, at 61. 
155 According to the Huffington Post and the U.S. National Debt Clock, the outstanding public debt 
of the United States as of October 7, 2008 surpassed $10 trillion.  See Scott Bittle & Jean Johnson, 
National Debt Passes $10 Trillion, No One Notices, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 7, 2008, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/scott-bittle-and-jean-johnson/national-debt-passes-10-t_b_132732.html; 
see also U.S. National Debt Clock, http://www.brillig.com/debt_clock/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2008). 
156 MILLER, supra note 124, at 235. 
157 Id. 
158 See PANCAKE, supra note 151, at 160-61.  Specifically,  
The new Constitution had conferred upon Congress the power to tax, and 
Congress had already in the summer of 1789 enacted tariff duties on imports and 
tonnage duties on shipping entering American ports.  The assurance of an 
income, the audacity and boldness of the young Secretary, the return of 
prosperity after the depression of the 1780’s – all these things inspired 
confidence . . . . It was this public confidence that resulted in the sale of the entire 
bond issue within a few weeks of its being put on the market. 
Id. at 161. 
159 Instead of annual appropriations by the [state or federal] legislature toward debt 
retirement, the creditors of the [federal] government were offered by Hamilton 
permanent appropriations inviolably dedicated to the payment of interest and 
principal.  Every guarantee possible under the Federal Constitution against 
popular ‘instability’ and ‘caprice’ was given public creditors . . .  
MILLER, supra note 124, at 236.  Indeed, the individuals that held the state war obligations were the 
same speculators that held the national securities involved in the domestic debt portion of Hamilton’s 
proposal.  Id. at 234-35.  
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surplus revenues from import and tonnage duties, interest saved on government 
securities which were redeemed, and proceeds from the sale of public lands.”160 
Hamilton’s proposal for the federal government to assume state debt was not 
just an action to help the “the people of the United States [who] labored under a 
heavy load of state debts” by way of taxes;161 it was a power play.  Hamilton was 
one of the chief proponents of the Federalist Party, which believed that the greater 
power in the federal-state relationship should exist within the federal 
government.162  Hamilton was sure that “if all the public creditors receive their 
dues from one source, distributed by an equal hand, their interests will be the same.  
And, having the same interests, they will unite in the support of the fiscal 
arrangements of the Government.”163  Hamilton wanted this support to be centrally 
united under the federal government and feared that with both the federal 
government and the states having large debts on their books, both entities would be 
forced to compete for the “allegiance of the creditor class and for the citizens’ tax 
dollar.”164  Thus, a shift of taxpayer investment from the states to the federal 
government meant a shift of taxpayer allegiance and support to the federal 
government.165  In essence, Hamilton was asking Congress to vest him with the 
power to single-handedly sway the coveted allegiance of the investor class 
American by tying him to the financial success of the federal government. 
                                                          
160 MYERS, supra note 127, at 63. 
160 MYERS, supra note 127, at 63. 
161 MILLER, supra note 124, at 234. 
162 Id. at 193, 195.   
The principle theme of The Federalist is that the purpose of the Constitution is 
the establishment of an energetic and efficient national government 
notwithstanding the powers reserved to the states.  Even though Hamilton 
deferred to the new kind of federalism created by the Constitution, it is clear from 
his essays that his sympathies lay wholly with nationalism.  Reference to “the 
streams of national power” and “the Fabric of American Empire” reveal that even 
while he was justifying the federalist system he was dreaming of the centralized 
system that he hoped would emerge from the chrysalis of federalism.   
Id. at 195. 
163 Id. at 235 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
164 Id. 
The result, Hamilton feared, would be that the states would attempt to pre-empt 
(as the Constitution, by recognizing concurrent taxation, permitted them to do) 
the remaining objects of taxation and that the affluent citizens of the United 
States would be divided against themselves, the state creditors seeking to 
strengthen the states while the holders of federal securities endeavored to 
aggrandize the powers and the revenues of the national government.   
Id.  Miller further explained: 
Hamilton regarded concurrent taxation as “‘the Gordion-knot of our political 
situation.”‘  In The Federalist he observed that the only way concurrent taxation 
could be made workable was for each government to exercise “reciprocal 
forbearance” by respecting the rights of the first occupant.  As Secretary of the 
Treasury, Hamilton left no doubt that he intended the federal government to do 
the occupying, while forbearance was to be practiced by the states.   
MILLER, supra note 124, at 235. 
165 “With all the creditors, state and national, gathered into the fold of the federal government, 
Hamilton’s vision of a powerful national government, supreme over the states, would begin to assume 
concrete reality.”  Id.  Miller believed that “Hamilton’s constant objective was to bind [speculators and 
investors] to the national government by the durable ties of ‘Ambition and Avarice.’”  Id. 
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Although Paulson’s request for authority under his bailout proposal was met 
with a notable amount of controversy, it pales in comparison to the uproar which 
followed Hamilton’s request for power under his report, especially as to the 
assumption of state debts.166  James Madison, one of the leaders of the Republican 
Party, opposed Hamilton’s proposal in Congress on the grounds that it forced 
citizens of states that had already paid off a large amount of their war debts to now 
pay federal taxes for the debts of other states.167  Much like Paulson’s later 
opposition, Hamilton’s opposition further feared that giving Hamilton the power to 
assume state debts would greatly “magnify” his power, as well as that of the 
federal government.168 
Hamilton’s opponents won the initial battle of the state assumption portion 
of his proposal, as it was defeated in the House thirty-one to twenty-nine.169  This 
was not the proposal’s death however, but rather its transformation into a political 
bargaining chip.  Republican leaders James Madison and Secretary of State 
Thomas Jefferson agreed in a “behind-the-scenes” meeting with Hamilton to drop 
their opposition of the state assumption bill in exchange for an agreement to 
support having the “new national capital at a site on the banks of the Potomac.”170  
With this alliance in place, the assumption of state debt became the final piece of 
Hamilton’s proposal to become law.171 
With the measures of the Report on Public Credit passed, Hamilton was 
authorized to use a great amount of discretion in managing172 what stood as a 
bailout worth 7/8 of the national debt – more than twelve times the amount Paulson 
would ever control under the EESA.173  Additionally, with almost every significant 
investor in the young nation now tied to Hamilton’s policy favoring the federal 
government, Hamilton also single-handedly held the power to drastically shift 
political favor to the federal government during the time when the nation’s 
foundation was being laid.  Although Paulson’s management of the TARP has had 
substantial economic consequences, it will have nowhere near the lasting political 
                                                          
166 Many of the political leaders of the time felt that Hamilton’s Report on the Public Credit was 
the first great controversy of the new nation, almost tearing the new union to bits.  Id. at 238.    
. . . Hamilton’s report fell like a bolt from the blue, utterly destroying the 
President’s hope that his administration would inaugurate an era of good feelings.  
In John Marshall’s words, Hamilton’s financial program “seemed to unchain all 
those fierce passions which a high respect for the government and for those who 
administered it, had in a great measure maintained.”  Before the storm blew itself 
out, some Americans were seriously considering disunion. 
Id. 
167 See PANCAKE, supra note 151, at 164-65.  This complaint is not much different than the 
complaints made by modern taxpayers who oppose paying taxes to bailout corporations. 
168 See MORRIS, supra note 137, at 287. 
169 PANCAKE, supra note 151, at 165. 
169 PANCAKE, supra note 151, at 165. 
170 MYERS, supra note 127, at 62; see also PANCAKE, supra note 151, at 166. 
171 MYERS, supra note 127, at 62. 
172 See id. at 63. 
173 With the bailout of the domestic debt ($40 million) and state war debts ($30 million after 
interest) represented $70 million of the $80 million national debt (the other $10 million being attributed 
to the country’s foreign debt).  See supra notes 128, 156-57.  The EESA’s maximum bailout of $700 
billion represented barely over seven percent of the current national debt, which continued to soar past 
$10 trillion.  See supra note 155. 
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and legal effect that Hamilton’s use of this political power has had on the nation’s 
governmental system.  The evidence of this was quickly seen as Hamilton used the 
exercise of his newly authorized power and influence in establishing the United 
States’ first national bank. 
B. The First National Bank 
Hamilton’s next major goal in addressing the public debt was the 
establishment of a public bank, a modern tool he believed the federal government 
needed for ongoing financial management.174  To this effect, Hamilton eventually 
submitted his historic Report on a National Bank to Congress in late 1790, 
effectively requesting that Congress establish the Bank of the United States.175  
With Congress having already firmly placed their trust in Hamilton by granting 
him great power and discretion in managing the public debt crisis, the issue of the 
bank itself was only moderately controversial as the bill proposing Hamilton’s 
bank passed both houses of Congress convincingly.176  However, State-rights 
oriented leaders such as Madison and Jefferson recognized that lying within 
Hamilton’s proposal was a request for immense authority as Hamilton implicitly 
asserted that Congress had the constitutional authority to establish a national 
bank.177   
With the foundational scope of Congress’ constitutional authority at issue, 
the debate that ensued became one of the most divisive and consequential political 
power struggles in United States history.  It was not a fight over a bank, but over 
power.  Since the bank bill had passed both houses of Congress, Madison and 
Jefferson took their argument to President Washington who had yet to sign the bill 
into law.178  Principally, Madison and Jefferson argued that Congress was 
authorized by the Constitution to act only upon its enumerated power under Article 
I and “measures indispensably necessary to give effect to [these enumerated] 
                                                          
174 MYERS, supra note 127, at 66.  Specifically, Hamilton saw that a public bank would be a great 
utility for the Treasury department in terms of “short term loans and for bills of exchange with which to 
make payments” for foreign debt.  Id.  Additionally, Hamilton believed that a national bank would 
substantially aide the country’s sprouting economy as it would grow the United States’ “circulating 
capital” and “[facilitate] payments for business and government.”  Id.  Furthermore, “Hamilton hoped to 
embody his ideal of a partnership between government and the business community by which 
government would stimulate and direct the activities of businessmen and receive in return part of their 
capital in the form of loans.”  MILLER, supra note 124, at 260.  Hamilton based his beliefs in a large 
part on the historical effects of the Bank of England.  Id. 
175 Id. 
176 See MILLER, supra note 124, at 264.  Hamilton did ask for a considerable amount of executive 
power in proposing the bank as it would be “bank of deposit, to act as the fiscal agent of the 
government, and to loan the government money.”  MILLER, supra note 124, at 261.  Furthermore, 
Hamilton’s proposal pushed the new country to unprecedented grounds among national governments, as 
the federal government would purchase $2 million (twenty percent) of the bank’s stock; something even 
England did not do with its own public bank.  MYERS, supra note 127, at 67-68.  Although the bank 
was managed by private citizens (the government would only be allowed to appoint five of the twenty 
five directors), Hamilton was personally authorized to inspect the bank’s books.  Id. at 68.  Even with 
all of these increases in power and changes to the nation’s financial landscape opponents of the bank’s 
bill “did not hope to defeat the bill, only to make some changes.”  HECHT, supra note 125, at 198. 
177 See MILLER, supra note 124, at 264. 
178 Id. 
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powers.”179  Accordingly, Madison and Jefferson argued that Congress could not 
establish a national bank because it was neither an enumerated power under Article 
I nor “indispensably necessary” to effectuate any of its other enumerated 
powers.180  Hamilton held the exact opposite view, arguing that the Constitution 
gave Congress general enumerated powers and the implied powers to effectuate 
such enumerated powers in the most effective manner (what is “necessary and 
proper,” not just as “indispensably necessary”).181  Washington sided with 
Hamilton and his interpretation, signing the bank bill into law.182 
In establishing such substantial power for Congress, Hamilton again 
procured great power for his own office by managing the public debt crisis through 
the execution of the First Bank of the United States.  Although the United States 
Bank would have its ups and downs in subsequent time periods, Hamilton’s Report 
on a National Bank was essentially the birth of the federal banking system; another 
lasting thumbprint on the nation.  In addition to further broadening his own 
authority and influence on the national economy, Hamilton again tremendously 
increased the power of the federal government within the federal-state relationship.  
Congress now had been assured of far-reaching implied powers, which 
consequentially won the Treasury Department an equally broad power of execution 
(the lasting effect memorialized within the Supreme Court’s approval in 
McCullough v. Maryland).183 
C. The Whiskey Rebellion 
Whereas Hamilton’s most financially consequential powers came through 
the before mentioned public credit crisis bailouts and establishment of the Bank of 
the United States, perhaps the greatest single display of Hamilton’s authority 
during his time as the Treasury Secretary came in his leading the Western Army to 
squash the “Whiskey Rebellion” in 1794.184  Hamilton, having taken full control of 
managing the assumed state debts, convinced Congress to place a large federal 
excise on manufactured whiskey in his Second Report on the Public Credit in 
1791.185  Grumblings amongst whiskey manufacturers began immediately upon the 
passage of the excise, eventually climaxing in 1794 within western counties of 
Pennsylvania through armed actions against Hamilton’s revenue officers and an 
assault on Pittsburgh.186 
                                                          
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 See id. at 263-65.  Hamilton believed that “the Bank of the United States was a necessary and 
proper means of carrying into effect the regulation of commerce between the states and of providing for 
the public credit and defense.”  Id. at 266.  
182 MILLER, supra note 124, at 267.   
182 MILLER, supra note 124, at 267.   
183 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
184 See MILLER, supra note 124, at 406-09. 
185 Id. at 396.  Hamilton had originally proposed the whiskey excise in his First Report on the 
Public Credit to no avail.  Id.  However, with Hamilton’s power and discretion in managing the 
assumed states’ debts now fully in motion, Congress “had very little to say in the matter . . . [and] the 
excise became law in early 1791.”  Id.  The excise on whiskey was a costly eight cents per gallon, or 
about “twenty-five percent of the net value of the product.”  Id. at 397. 
186 Id. at 405.   
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After personally convincing the Supreme Court that the federal government 
needed to resort to force to successfully oppose the insurrection, Hamilton set out 
with President Washington to lead the 13,000-man army (a force roughly the size 
of the Continental Army that fought in the Revolutionary War)187 against the 
“whiskey boys.”188  Once it had been decided that the army would have to cross 
the Allegheny Mountains to meet the insurrection forces, Washington returned to 
Philadelphia to see to other pressing matters.189  Although Governor Lee of 
Virginia was supposed to have been the ranking official with Washington’s 
departure (as it was a multi-state militia force), Hamilton was reputed to have been 
“the real leader” of the forces and would “[run] the show.”190  “Hamilton issued 
orders in his own name” and even rebuked the acting governor of Pennsylvania, 
General Thomas Mifflin (another supposed ranking official).191  It was reported 
that Hamilton “indulged in the airs of a commander-in-chief and, capitalizing upon 
his friendship with Washington, made his influence felt in every department of the 
army.”192  Soldiers of the army could hardly believe “[t]hat they were in the 
presence of a mere Secretary of Treasury.”193  Hamilton led the troops across the 
Alleghany Mountains and captured 150 members of the insurrection (including the 
“whiskey boys” spokesman Hugh Henry Brackenridge); effectively dispersing the 
opposing forces and ending the rebellion.194 
D. Final Summary and Comparison of Alexander Hamilton’s Powers 
It is clear that in context, the EESA’s $700 billion capped bailout did not 
give Paulson the “unprecedented” power that many had claimed.  In the face of an 
analogously dire financial crisis, Hamilton was given greater deference to establish 
and manage a bailout of the United States financial system that was worth 7/8 of 
the nation’s total debt; an amount comparatively twelve times larger in scope than 
the bailout under Paulson.195  Furthermore, Hamilton used his authority over state 
debt to tie the United States’ investor class to the federal government, ultimately 
leveraging this authority to establish a national bank and secure broad implied 
                                                          
Revenue officers were terrorized – sometimes at gun point – into resigning their 
offices; United States marshals were forcibly prevented from serving processes 
upon rioters; and the United States mail was seized by armed bands.  Early in 
August, 1794, a meeting of armed men was held at Braddock’s Field and 
preparations were made to attack Pittsburgh; the assault was averted only when 
the citizens, realizing that they could not withstand the attackers, marched out to 
join them. 
Id. 
187 See NationMaster.com, Whiskey Rebellion, http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/ 
Whiskey-Rebellion (last visited Jan. 15, 2009). 
188 MILLER, supra note 124, at 406-07. 
189 Id. at 408-09. 
190 Id. at 409. 
191 See id; Encyclopedia.com, Thomas Mifflin Facts, http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1-
Mifflin.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2009). 
192 MILLER, supra note 124, at 409. 
193 Id. 
194 See id. at 409-13. 
195 See supra text accompanying note 173. 
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powers for Congress in the process.196  With the momentum of such authority and 
power, Hamilton raised heavy excises for the federal debt and led an army of 
13,000 men to defend his purposes.197  Thus, Hamilton was granted far more 
authority by Congress and exercised such power to a far greater extent (and to a 
much greater consequence) than was ever possible for Paulson. 
The principle of a congressional pattern was established with Hamilton; 
extreme financial and economic challenges led Congress to grant the acting 
Treasury Secretary equally extreme measures of authority to seek resolution.  
Although Hamilton is likely to have been the most powerful and influential 
proponent of this pattern, the next section of this article will show that he really 
was just the beginning.  Section V will shed light upon the continuation of this 
pattern by briefly examining a few of the more notable Treasury Secretaries that 
have faced critical financial challenge in subsequent United States history; thus 
putting Paulson not at the front, but rather at the back of a rather large line. 
V. THE LONG LINE OF IMMENSLY POWERFUL TREASURY 
SECRETARIES DURING TIMES OF FINANCIAL CRISIS 
A. Salmon P. Chase and the Financial Crisis of the Civil War (1861-1864) 
The five years leading to the civil war were not only wrought with bitter 
political conflict, but also severe financial and economic crisis.198  On the heels of 
such crises, the national debt had doubled during 1857-1860 to $60 million, with 
the Treasury balance hovering meagerly around $3.6 million.199  In order to meet 
current obligations, the Treasury resorted to paying exorbitant twelve percent 
interest rates.200  Even congressmen went without salary for several weeks in 
1860.201  With this load on the nation’s back, or rather on the ‘Union’s’ back, the 
United States prepared to wage and finance the most expensive war in its young 
history.202 
When President Abraham Lincoln appointed Salmon P. Chase as his 
Treasury Secretary in 1861, he essentially handed him a $75 million national debt, 
a paper-thin checkbook, and the guarantee that the looming war would only make 
matters worse.203  Chase was confident of a quick defeat of the Southern Army and 
proposed an optimistic $320 million revenue plan for the next year to be 
                                                          
196 MILLER, supra note 124, at 267. 
197 Id. at 406-07. 
198 There had been a large financial panic in 1857 that caused banks to fail nationwide and sunk the 
United States into recession through the beginning of the Civil War.  See generally JAMES L. HUSTON, 
THE PANIC OF 1857 AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR 13-34 (Louisiana State University Press 
1987). 
199 MYERS, supra note 127, at 149. 
200 IRWIN UNGER, THE GREENBACK ERA: A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
FINANCE, 1865-1879, at 13 (Princeton University Press 1964). 
201 MYERS, supra note 127, at 149. 
202 UNGER, supra note 200, at 14-15. 
203 See ROBERT P. SHARKEY, MONEY, CLASS, AND PARTY: AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF CIVIL WAR 
AND RECONSTRUCTION 16-17 (The Johns Hopkins Press 1959). 
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accomplished in large part by issuing federal securities.204  However, the Union’s 
defeat at the Battle of Bull Run in July of 1861 assured a long war with the 
Southern Army205 and illuminated just how insufficient Chase’s financial 
projections had been.206  “The soldiers needed to be paid” and Chase had to find a 
way to do it.207 
1. The Birth of Greenbacks: Chase’s Authority to Print Money Out 
of Thin Air 
Chase reported the anticipated Treasury deficit in his Annual Report in 1861, 
causing a public panic that froze gold trading on the market, which in turn caused 
further crisis as the gold specie that backed the national coin became scarce in 
Treasury reserves.208  The Treasury did the unthinkable: it ceased to pay coin for 
its debt obligations and dropped the “gold standard” for the foreseeable future.209  
With the revenue crisis now further compounded by the lack of physical money, 
the federal government’s growing war debt appeared impossible.  Chase needed 
more power, new power; he needed to make money appear out of thin air.   
In the face of such a meltdown, that’s exactly what Congress let him do.  By 
way of three Legal Tender Acts from 1862-1863, Congress authorized Chase to 
issue and spend the nation’s first non-specie “legal tender paper money” or 
“greenbacks” up to the staggering amount of $450 million.210  For the first time 
ever, a Treasury Secretary paid for debt through a currency that was backed by 
promises alone.211   
Essentially, Congress granted Chase perhaps the greatest power a Treasury 
Secretary could ever have asked for, the ability to print money at will.  The United 
States $10,000 bill features a portrait of Chase as a monument to this tremendous 
power and to the ramped inflation it would later cause.212  However, the monument 
which would perhaps best depict the magnitude of Chase’s greenback power was 
later erected by Chase himself, as he would rule as Chief Justice of the United 
States Supreme Court that the authority given to him under the Legal Tender Act 
to issue the greenbacks (the very power that he had pleaded for and exercised only 
seven years earlier) was unconstitutional.213 
                                                          
204 Id. at 19. 
205 See JASON GOODWIN, GREENBACK: THE ALMIGHTY DOLLAR AND THE INVENTION OF AMERICA 
219 (Henry Holt & Company 2003). 
206 SHARKEY, supra note 203, at 19-20. 
207 GOODWIN, supra note 205, at 219. 
208 UNGER, supra note 200, at 14. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 14-15. 
211 GOODWIN, supra note 205, at 220.  
Secretary Chase, who only six months earlier had warned against the danger of 
irredeemable paper, now took the position of “regretting exceedingly” the 
“necessity,” and accepting it as “the mode most useful and least hurtful” to the 
general interest . . . . The Act . . . provided for an issue of notes to be “lawful 
money and legal tender in payment of all debts public and private . . . .”   
MYERS, supra note 127, at 155. 
212 GOODWIN, supra note 205, at 220. 
213 See Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869). 
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2. Chase and the Nation’s First Federal Income Tax 
In order to further boost revenue for a war that cost nearly $2 million per 
day,214 Chase proposed that Congress install the nation’s first federal income 
tax.215  Congress agreed to the proposal and granted Chase the truly unprecedented 
power to collect taxes on income through the Revenue Act of 1861.216  Congress 
further empowered Chase to collect the nation’s first income tax by creating the 
Internal Revenue Board (which would later become the Internal Revenue Service) 
in 1862.217  Similar to Chase’s greenback power, his monumental power to collect 
income taxes was later ruled to be unconstitutional (only to be brought back to life 
in 1913 by the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution).218 
3. Chase’s National Banking System 
Congress’ authorization for the issuance of greenbacks concurrently 
provided Chase with a platform to seek further power for a government-backed 
national banking system that would provide for a common national currency.219  
Indeed, Chase did more than advocate for such a system, he “. . . demanded it as an 
instrument of war policy and hinted that he would resign if the scheme did not 
receive Congressional approval.”220  Upon President Lincoln’s further insistence, 
Congress passed the National Bank Act in 1863,221 authorizing Chase to directly 
involve the United States in banking for the first time in its history.222  Chase’s 
National Bank Act was a move so vast and dramatic that one author believes that, 
“[i]t was only in the midst of such a war that such a bill could have been 
passed.”223 
4. Salmon P. Chase Conclusion 
In terms of receiving “unprecedented power,” there are few, if any, Treasury 
Secretaries that are comparable to Salmon Chase.  In order to meet the financial 
crisis surrounding the Civil War period, Congress authorized Chase to issue and 
spend $450 million of non-specie greenbacks, collect taxes from income, and 
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establish a national banking system.224  All three of these powers were firsts in 
American history and proved to be tremendously powerful tools for the Treasury 
Secretary to influence the national economy. 
B. William McAdoo: World War I and the European Investment Crisis 
(1913-1918) 
The buildup to World War I brought unease amongst investors worldwide.  
Unfortunately, a great bulk of this uneasiness fell upon the United States, as it was 
one of the few nations of financial power that did not have a central banking 
system in place.225  In the spring of 1914, European investors finally panicked and 
began cashing in their United States based securities and currency for gold specie 
at catastrophic levels, causing a full-scale gold run.226  This created an immediate 
financial crisis, as the Treasury Department and major banks would not be able to 
cash out the entirety of the demand.227  With the nation’s gold and financial 
confidence bleeding uncontrollably, the United States dollar and its financial 
markets were quickly brought to the edge of a freefall.228 
Treasury Secretary William G. McAdoo needed to act quickly and 
decisively.  On July 31, 1914, McAdoo ordered the New York Stock Exchange 
(“NYSE”) to be shut down to prevent any further run on capital.229  Many were 
outraged as McAdoo’s action admittedly fell somewhere high upon the tyrannical 
spectrum; however, it did ultimately serve its purpose as the gold run abroad was 
quickly halted.230  With such financial consequences on the line, Congress left the 
action unchallenged, as McAdoo would continue to keep the NYSE closed for an 
unprecedented four straight months.231 
While the foreign security problem had been met, McAdoo still needed to 
stop the bank run domestically.  McAdoo decided to essentially bailout the United 
States financial system by pumping the market full of “emergency currency,” thus 
allowing banks to continue to supply capital while retaining gold specie.232  Unlike 
many of his predecessors, McAdoo did not have to plead with Congress for this 
power, as Congress had already established this magnified authority for Treasury 
Secretary George Cortelyou233 in the recent banking crisis of 1907 through the 
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Alrdrich-Vreeland Act.234  Congress submitted to the necessity of the new 
mounting crisis and continued to let this bailout power run to McAdoo as he 
eventually issued the emergency currency.235  In addition to this national bailout, 
McAdoo would further organize a bailout of New York City’s massive foreign 
debt, a move that one author called the single-handed introduction of the “[T]oo 
Big Too Fail doctrine” into the American financial system.236 
Having stopped the bleeding of American gold and confidence, McAdoo 
wanted to pull the nation (and its gold reserves) up from financial gloom and back 
into prosperity.  McAdoo pushed Congress’ deference even further by persuading 
them to establish the Bureau of War Risk Insurance, a government entity that 
would provide domestic shippers insurance to ship American cargo across the war-
ridden Atlantic Ocean to Europeans that were in great need of products like 
cotton.237  With McAdoo’s Bureau hedging the risky voyages, European traders 
paid for American goods with much of the gold that had been retracted.238  
McAdoo’s act of restoring the nation’s gold reserves allowed banks to retire the 
emergency currency and gave him the confidence to reopen the NYSE.239  With 
stability in the national market restored, McAdoo pushed the nation into the 
powerful realm of global financial lenders as he introduced the first United States 
Federal Reserve Banking System in the fall of 1914.240 
C. William H. Woodin (1933) & Henry Morgenthau Jr. (1934-1945): 
Control over Banks and Gold During the Great Depression 
The Great Depression presented the United States with a frightening 
monetary crisis in 1933.  With the American dollar actually depreciating, 
Americans frantically exchanged whatever currency or security they could for 
gold.241  This widespread demand drained the Federal Reserve’s gold supply 
almost past the point of the legal minimum and forced newly-elected President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt to take immediate action.242  Roosevelt relied upon the 
World War I Trading with the Enemy Act (“TEA”) to order that all commercial 
banks be closed until his administration could approve reopening on a bank-by-
bank basis.243  Essentially, Roosevelt declared a war upon the Great Depression.  
Widespread criticism arose over whether the TEA actually granted such power, 
causing Roosevelt to seek post-action confirmation from Congress through an 
amendment to the TEA.244 
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The amendment was proposed as the Emergency Banking Relief Act of 1933 
(“EBRA”), a bill that would not only have confirmed Roosevelt’s previous actions, 
but would also have granted the President and his Treasury Secretary William 
Woodin great unilateral power going forward.245  Congress met within an 
emergency session and passed the EBRA on a “voice vote” without actually seeing 
or debating the text of the bill.246  With the weight of the worst economic crisis in 
history bearing down upon the United States, Congress once again deferred and 
greatly magnified the Treasury Secretary’s power.247  In order to meet the 
monetary crisis, the EBRA authorized Woodin to confiscate “any or all gold coin, 
gold bullion, and gold certificates” from any individual or corporation.248  
Additionally, the EBRA allowed Roosevelt to grant Woodin the sole discretion and 
authority to decide which commercial banks could reopen.249  Essentially, Woodin 
now personally controlled all the gold and banks in the entire country without any 
check on his power. 
Woodin fell ill and passed this power to Henry Morgenthau Jr. in 1934.250  
Morgenthau soon discovered that because he physically controlled all the gold in 
the United States (which had been turned over to the federal government by 
executive order), he also reigned over the gold markets. 251  Morgenthau met with 
Roosevelt every morning by his bedside to eat breakfast and arbitrarily set the 
price of gold in an increasing trend to encourage inflation.252  All the while, 
Congress continued to differ without challenge.  Morgenthau described the process 
in his diary: 
The actual price of gold on any given day made little difference.  The 
amounts settled on were generally arbitrary.  One day, for instance, the bedside 
conference decided on a rise of [twenty-one] c[ents]; “It’s a lucky number,” the 
President remarked, “because it’s three times seven.” 
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. . . If anybody ever knew how we set the gold price through a combination 
of lucky numbers and so forth, I think they would really be frightened.253 
VI. CONCLUSION 
There has been no great gap between Alexander Hamilton and Henry 
Paulson.  Since the Treasury Department’s creation, financial crisis has almost 
continually caused Congress to magnify the Treasury Secretary’s authority to great 
and “unprecedented” heights.  Members of this elite line have initiated and 
controlled massive public and private bailouts,254 printed money at will,255 flooded 
financial markets with emergency currency,256 controlled financial markets,257 shut 
down financial markets,258 confiscated all the gold in the country,259 and led a 
13,000-man army to enforce treasury excises.260  Paulson was simply the most 
current member of this growing line, a recent proponent of the Congressional 
pattern to inflate Treasury Secretary power during times of financial crisis. 
Indeed, Congress granted Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson historic 
authority to address the 2008 financial crisis through the EESA’s $700 billion 
capped bailout plan.  However, as broad and consequential as this authority was, 
analysis of past financial crises and Treasury Secretary authority has shown that 
such heightened power was by no means “unprecedented.”  In fact, the EESA was 
proof that the longstanding Congressional pattern to magnify Treasury Secretary 
authority during financial crisis will likely continue indefinitely.  This conclusion 
is substantially relevant to the business, legal, and political realms for two main 
reasons. 
First, the business, banking, and finance world should be aware that financial 
crises have frequently resulted in Treasury Secretaries becoming intimately 
involved in either greatly empowering or greatly restricting business and market 
action.  Although such actions have been very contextual, this history gives the 
business world a general precedent to rely upon in predicting future intervention 
and planning accordingly.  At the very least, for planning purposes, such history 
should prevent members of the business world from ruling out any plausible 
Treasury Secretary intervention measure on the premise that such a measure would 
be too powerful or “unprecedented.”261 
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Second, Congress and other political leaders must recognize that American 
history has shown that financial crises often necessitate a concentration of power in 
the Treasury Secretary.  Recognition that a longstanding Congressional trend exists 
to greatly empower Treasury Secretaries during times of crisis should give future 
political leaders confidence to empower the Treasury Secretary if this action would 
be the most effective and efficient solution to a crisis.  This recognition should 
prevent the unnecessary political delay of congressional leaders getting hung-up on 
hesitations that empowering the Treasury Secretary is somehow novel or un-
American.  Whereas Congress must always delegate power responsibly with 
measures of oversight and checks on unilateral power, recognition of Treasury 
Secretary history should also prevent Congress from over-burdening or 
‘handcuffing’ the Secretary when the crisis calls for an efficient use of power.  
Congress must remember that the Treasury Secretary’s capability to act quickly 
and efficiently is the very aspect that sets the office apart as an effective tool. 
This is not to say that this historical precedent mandates that Congress 
recklessly give the Treasury Secretary power for the sake of granting power, as 
instances such as Salmon Chase’s greenback power proved to have long-lasting 
detrimental effects on the economy.262  Rather, this historical precedent simply 
calls political leaders to not be so hesitant to consider the option that Congress has 
used to address so many of this nation’s crises: a grant of power, even 
tremendously broad and “unprecedented” power, to the Treasury Secretary. 
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